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PREFACE
This work selects a basic privacy standard such as `-diversity under the high utility
data publishing scheme anatomization, and shows theoretically that every additional
information matters to ﬁt a classiﬁer on the private data. The main part of this work
is one of the few theoretical takes on the data classiﬁcation in the privacy context,
the ﬁrst take on the non-diﬀerential privacy based alternatives. However, this work is
not the ﬁrst attempt to study the data classiﬁcation in the context of data privacy. It
doesn’t attempt to compete with other popular privacy standards such as diﬀerential
privacy either.
Some parts of the work are quite empirical whereas other parts of the work are
quite theoretical. Chapter 4 requires some information security and data mining
background. Basic knowledge of privacy, decision trees and data classiﬁcation would
be suﬃcient to capture the core idea of the proposed algorithm. Chapters 5 and
6 on the other hand require solid theoretical background on the statistical machine
learning and pattern recognition. Chapter 5 in particular is quite dry in most parts
of the proofs. I tried to give some examples to reveal the core idea of the algorithms
and the motivation of the theoretical outcome in these chapters.
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ABSTRACT
Mancuhan, Koray PhD, Purdue University, December 2017. Data Classiﬁcation for
`-diversity . Major Professor: Chris Clifton.
Corporations are retaining ever-larger corpuses of personal data; the frequency
of breaches and corresponding privacy impact has been rising accordingly. One way
to mitigate this risk is through use of anonymized data, limiting the exposure of individual data to only where it is absolutely needed. This would seem particularly
appropriate for data mining, where the goal is generalizable knowledge rather than
data on speciﬁc individuals. In practice, corporate data miners often insist on original
data, for fear that they might miss something with anonymized or diﬀerentially private
approaches. This dissertation provides both empirical and theoretical justiﬁcations
for the use of anonymized data, in particular for a speciﬁc scheme of anonymization
called anatomization (or anatomized data). Anatomized data preserves all attribute
values, but introduces uncertainty in the mapping between identifying and sensitive
values, thus satisfying `-diversity. We ﬁrst propose a promising decision tree learning
algorithm. Empirical results show that this algorithm produces decision trees approaching the accuracy of non-private decision trees. We then show that a k-nearest
neighbor classiﬁer and a support vector classiﬁer trained on anatomized data are theoretically expected to do as well as on the original data under certain conditions. The
theoretical eﬀectiveness of the latter approaches are validated using several publicly
available datasets, showing that we outperform the state of the art for nearest neighbor and support vector classiﬁcation using training data protected by k-anonymity,
and are comparable to learning on the original data.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many privacy deﬁnitions have been proposed based on generalizing/suppressing data
(`-diversity [1], k-anonymity [2,3], t-closeness [4], δ-presence [5], (α,k)-anonymity [6]).
Other alternatives include value swapping [7], distortion [8], randomization [9], and
noise addition (e.g., diﬀerential privacy [10]). Generalization consists of replacing
identifying attribute values with a less speciﬁc version [3]. Suppression can be viewed
as the ultimate generalization, replacing the identifying value with an “any” value [3].
Generalization has the advantage of preserving truth, but a less speciﬁc truth that
reduces utility of the published data.
Xiao and Tao proposed anatomization as a method to enforce `-diversity while preserving speciﬁc data values [11]. Anatomization splits instances across two tables, one
containing identifying information and the other containing private information. The
more general approach of fragmentation [12] divides a given dataset’s attributes into
two sets of attributes (2 partitions) such that an encryption mechanism avoids associations between two diﬀerent small partitions. Vimercati et al. extend fragmentation
to multiple partitions [13], and Tamas et al. propose an extension that deals with multiple sensitive attributes [14]. The main advantage of anatomization/fragmentation
is that it preserves the original values of data; the uncertainty is only in the mapping
between individuals and sensitive values.
This dissertation proposes that this additional information has real value. First,
we propose a simple decision tree learning algorithm for distributed data classiﬁcation
and justify the algorithm through the experiments on real data. We then demonstrate
that in theory, learning from anatomized data can be as good as learning from the
raw data for k-nearest neighbor and support vector classiﬁcation. The empirical
results of these classiﬁcation algorithms show that learning from anatomized data
beats learning from generalization-based anonymization.
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In the theoretical analysis, this dissertation looks only at k-nearest neighbor classiﬁer (k-NN) and support vector classiﬁer (SVC). This focus was chosen because
there are solid theoretical results on the limits of learning using k-NN from statistical pattern recognition. There is also solid theory about the generalization ability
of the SVC from the statistical learning theory. The existing theory allows us to
compare theoretical bounds on learning from anatomized data with learning from the
underlying unprotected data. In k-NN, we demonstrate this for a simple approach
of anatomizing the data; we simply consider all possible mappings of individuals to
sensitive values as equally likely. In SVC, we pick one of the equally likely sensitive
values for each individual so that the resulting SVC would have the best expected
generalization.
There is concern that anatomization is vulnerable to several prior knowledge attacks [15], [16]. In addition, the membership attacks is also an existing issue of
anatomization despite the lack of suﬃcient prior knowledge [17]. While this can be
an issue, any method that provides any meaningful utility fails to provide perfect
privacy against a suﬃciently strong adversary [10, 18]. Legally recognized standards
such as the so-called “Safe Harbor” rules of the U.S. Healthcare Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [19] allow release of data that bears some risk of
re-identiﬁcation; the belief is that the greater good of beneﬁcial use of the data outweighs the risk to privacy. Besides, anatomization can be robust against some recent
attacks such as minimality [20, 21].
This dissertation does not attempt to resolve that issue (although we use a randomized rather than optimized grouping that provides resistance to the prior knowledge attacks above). Instead, it investigates the feasible data classiﬁcation models for
anatomization. Our theoretical analysis holds for any assignment of items to anatomy
groups, including a random assignment, which provides a high degree of robustness
against minimality and correlation-based attacks. While this does not eliminate privacy risk, if the alternative is to use the original data, we show that anatomy provides
comparable utility while reducing the privacy risk.
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The rest of this dissertation is organized as follow. Chapter 2 summarizes related
work, deﬁnes the problem statement and underlines the key contributions. Chapter 3
gives the set of deﬁnitions that are required to elaborate further discussion. Chapter
4 discusses the distributed decision tree classiﬁcation for the anatomized data while
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the k-NN and SVC. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation
with an overall summary of the work.
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2 RELATED WORK AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1 Classiﬁcation Related Work and Problem Statement
There have been studies on how to train classiﬁers on anonymized data. The
existing work can be grouped into three categories: generalization based classiﬁcation, distribution reconstruction based classiﬁcation, and diﬀerential privacy based
classiﬁcation.
In generalization based classiﬁcation, nearest neighbor classiﬁcation using generalized data was investigated by Martin [22]. Nested generalization and non-nested
hyperrectangles were used to generalize the data from which the nearest neighbor
classiﬁers were trained. Iyengar suggested using a classiﬁcation metric so as to ﬁnd
the optimum generalization. Then, a C4.5 decision tree classiﬁer was trained from
the optimally generalized training data [23]. Zhang et al. studied Naı̈ve Bayes using
partially speciﬁed training data [24], proposing a conditional likehoods computation
algorithm exploring the instance space of attribute-value generalization taxonomies.
Inan et al. proposed nearest neighbor and support vector machine classiﬁers using
anonymized training data that satisfy k-anonymity. Taylor approximation was used
to estimate the dot product, Euclidean distance and kernel function from generalized
data [25].
In distribution reconstruction based classiﬁcation, Agrawal et al. proposed an iterative distribution reconstruction algorithm for distorted training data from which a
C4.5 decision tree classiﬁer was trained [8,26]. Fung et al. gave a top-down specialization method (TDS) for anonymization so that the anonymized data allows accurate
decision trees. A new scoring function was proposed for the calculation of decision
tree splits from the compressed training data [27]. Dowd et al. studied C4.5 decision tree learning from training data perturbed by random substitutions. A matrix
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based distribution reconstruction algorithm was applied on the perturbed training
data from which an accurate C4.5 decision tree classiﬁer was learned [28].
In diﬀerential privacy based classiﬁcation, Rubinstein et al. studied the kernels of
support vector machine under diﬀerential privacy and showed the trade-oﬀ between
privacy level and data utility. They analyzed ﬁnite and inﬁnite dimensional kernels as
a function of the approximation error under diﬀerential privacy [29]. Lin at al. studied
training support vector classiﬁcation for outsourced data. Random transformation
was applied on the training set so that the cloud server could compute an accurate
model without knowing what the actual values were [30]. Jain et al. studied support
vector machine kernels in the diﬀerential privacy setting. They proposed diﬀerentially
private mechanisms to train support vector machines for interactive, semi-interactive
and non-interactive learning scenarios, providing theoretical analysis of the proposed
approaches [31]. Freidman et al. investigate learning C4.5 decision trees from datasets
that satisfy diﬀerential privacy [32]. Jagannathan et al. propose a tree classiﬁer based
on random forests that is built from diﬀerentially private data [33]. Vaidya et al.
give a Naive Bayes Classiﬁcation scheme that publishes the model parameters with
diﬀerential privacy [34]. Duchi et al. study the statistical inference under a privacy
description called local privacy that is relevant to diﬀerential privacy [35]. They derive
the convergence rate of a statistical estimator where the data is kept conﬁdential even
from the learner. Duchi et al. later extend this work to the concept of diﬀerentially
local privacy which captures both local and diﬀerential privacy concepts in the context
of convex risk minimization [36].
Other work related to the classiﬁers on anatomized data are the ones for vertically/horizontally partitioned data and outsourced data to a semi-honest third party.
Vaidya et al. propose decision trees for vertically partitioned data [37]. Giannella
et al. study a similar decision tree learning problem reducing the communication
overhead [38]. Vaidya et al. later proposes a new random decision tree learning
framework to learn models from vertically or horizontally partitioned data [39]. They
extend some existing techniques in [37] such that the learning is more scalable for par-
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allel processing. Yu et al. investigate support vector machine learning for vertically
partitioned data [40]. Hu et al. propose an alternative support vector machine learning with less computation overhead of vertically partitioned data [41]. Mangasarian
et al. investigate the support vector machine learning in case of horizontally partioned data [42]. Vertically/horizontally partitioned techniques are generally based
on secure multiparty computation. These techniques make strong assumptions about
data partitions and what data can be shared, and typically assume that each party
holding data has signiﬁcant computational power. For example, some decision tree
techniques assume that two tuples of two partitions can be linked directly to each
other, that the tuples are ordered in the same way; and that the class labels are
known for both partitions.
None of the earlier work has provided a classiﬁer directly applicable to anatomized
training data. Such a classiﬁer requires speciﬁc theoretical and experimental analysis,
because anatomized training data provides additional detail that has the potential
to improve learning; but also additional uncertainty that must be dealt with. Furthermore, most of the previous work didn’t justify theoretically why the proposed
heuristics let classiﬁers generalize well. Therefore, this dissertation states problem
2.1.1:
Problem 2.1.1 Deﬁne heuristics to train classiﬁers on anatomized data without violating `-diversity while using the sensitive information, with a theoretical guarantee
of good generalization under reasonable assumptions.
Our solution to the problem 2.1.1 will have the following key contributions to the
privacy preserving data mining community in the upcoming chapters:
1. We deﬁne a classiﬁcation task on anatomized data without violating the random
worlds assumption. A violating classiﬁcation task would be the prediction of
sensitive attribute, a task that was found to be #P-complete by Kifer [15].
Besides, it would also be out of the scope of problem 2.1.1.
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2. This dissertation proposes a distributed decision tree algorithm which solves
partially the problem 2.1.1. The promising results of this method motivate the
theoretically solid methods.
3. To our best knowledge, this is the ﬁrst dissertation in the privacy community
that studies the theoretical eﬀect of training the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) and
support vector classiﬁcation (SVC) on anatomized data. We show the generalization error for a non-parametric classiﬁer and support vector classiﬁer using
the anatomized training data. In case of k-NN, we also show the anatomization
eﬀect for the error rate bounds and the convergence rate.
4. In the experiments, we compare the distributed decision tree, k-NN and SVC
classiﬁers trained on the anatomized data with the respective counterparts
trained on the unprotected data. In cases of nearest neighbor (NN), SVC and
support vector machines (SVMs), we also make an additional comparison to
generalization based learning scheme [25].
Note that the test data is assumed to be neither anonymized nor anatomized.
Inan et al. give a practical application of such a learning scenario [25]:
Several hospitals may collaborate to create one large anonymized data set
which is then shared among all collaborating hospitals. For a researcher in
a participating hospital who is interested in using data mining to classify
the patients? of the hospital, there will be at least two options. Either,
the researcher can build a classiﬁer using the local data set and use it for
new patients or he/she can build a classiﬁer using the large anonymized
data set that involves many more samples and use it for new patients. To
see which of these two options is better, we need to be able to classify
original data (e.g., the medical records of the new patient) using data
mining models built on anonymized data.
Another case would be outsourcing where the owner of the personal data releases
the anonymized or anatomized version to a third party such as cloud server for both
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storage and machine learning purposes [43]. The data should be protected under
some privacy standard due to the sensitivity of the personal information. The owner
of data can still use the processing power of the cloud server to train computationally
expensive machine learning models in addition to the storage ability.

2.2 Other Related Work
There have been studies about handling private data in data mining tasks such
as clustering and pattern mining.
In the clustering task, Oliveira et al. studies privacy preserving clustering techniques based on data transformation [44]. Ngai et al. propose a clustering algorithm
that handles the anonymized data as uncertain information [45]. Kriegel et al. propose a hierarchical density based clustering method using fuzzy objects [46]. Xiao et
al. discusses the problem of distance calculation for uncertain objects [47].
In pattern mining task, Evﬁmievski et al. studies the frequent itemset mining from
randomized data [9, 48]. Chui et al. [49] and Leung et al. [50] address the frequent
itemset mining problem as well. Atzori et al. focus on the privacy preservation of
pattern mining results [51]. Atzori et al. later propose a new frequent itemset mining
algorithm for k-anonymized data [52]. Zeng et al. proposes a new apriori algorithm
for frequent itemset mining of diﬀerentially private data [53]. Lee et al. focus on
extracting top frequent itemsets using FP-trees that are diﬀerentially private [54].
The last group of approaches related to mining the anatomized data are the employment of data mining to improve the data utility and the privacy guarantee of
anatomization. Li et al. formulate the background knowledge using frequent itemset
mining in order to hack and to improve the anatomization [55]. Al Bouna et al.
improve the anatomization in case of transactional databases so that the anatomized
data supports eﬀective frequent itemset mining [56]. Mirakabad et al. devise an
apriori algorithm to publish data respecting `-diversity, an alternative to the bucke-
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tization of Xiao et al. [57]. Mirakabad et al. also propose an extended anatomization
using clustering so as to minimize information loss [58].
We have seen from the previous and the current section that the classiﬁcation task
has been studied more thoroughly than the other data mining tasks in the privacy
preserving data mining community. The reason of this focus is that the classiﬁcation
algorithms have deeper theoretical understanding about the generalization properties.
It is also easier to evaluate the classiﬁcation tasks as it is part of the supervised
learning which includes the ground truth (class label). Thus, the proposed algorithms
depend less on the empirical results of the existing data. This dissertation will also
focus on the classiﬁcation tasks for similar reasons. Pattern mining has recently been
studied by Hamzaoui et al. for anatomized data satisfying `-diversity [59].
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3 DEFINITIONS
The ﬁrst four deﬁnitions restate standard deﬁnitions of unprotected data and attribute types.
Deﬁnition 3.0.1 A dataset D is called a person speciﬁc dataset for population P
if each instance xi ∈ D belongs to a unique individual p ∈ P . The person speciﬁc
dataset has the schema in (3.1)
(C, A1 , ..., Ad , As )

(3.1)

where C is the class attribute, Ai , ..., Ad are quasi-identifying attributes, and As is
the sensitive attribute. Quasi-identifying and sensitive attributes are deﬁned below.
The person speciﬁc dataset will be called the original training data in this paper.
Next, we deﬁne the types of attributes.
Deﬁnition 3.0.2 A set of attributes are called direct identifying attributes if they
let an adversary associate an instance xi ∈ D to a unique individual p ∈ P without
any background knowledge.
Deﬁnition 3.0.3 A set of attributes are called quasi-identifying attributes if there is
background knowledge available to the adversary that associates the quasi-identifying
attributes with a unique individual p ∈ P .
We include both direct and quasi-identifying attributes under the name identifying
attributes. First name, last name and social security number (SSN) are common
examples of direct identifying attributes. Direct identifying attributes are generally
not useful in machine learning as unique identiﬁers would not generalize. Hence, the
schema in (3.1) typically does not include any direct identifying attributes. They
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can be suppressed but other information can be both useful and assist in identifying
individuals. Some common examples of quasi-identifying attributes are age, postal
code, and occupation. These are assumed to be public knowledge and thus need not
be protected. Thus, the quasi-identifying attributes are included in schema (3.1) as
A1 , ..., Ad . Next, we will give the second type of attribute.
Deﬁnition 3.0.4 An attribute As of D is called a sensitive attribute if we should
protect against adversaries correctly inferring the value for any individual xi ∈ D.
Patient disease and individual income are common examples of sensitive attributes.
Unique individuals p ∈ P typically don’t want these sensitive information to be revealed to individuals without a direct need to know that information.
Given the former deﬁnitions, we will next deﬁne the anonymized training data
following the deﬁnition of k-anonymity [3].
Deﬁnition 3.0.5 A training dataset D that satisﬁes the following conditions is said
to be k-anonymized training data Dk [3]:
1. The training data Dk does not contain any unique identifying attributes.
2. Every instance xi ∈ Dk is indistinguishable from at least (k − 1) other instances
in Dk with respect to its quasi-identifying attributes.
Anatomy satisﬁes a slightly weaker deﬁnition; the indistinguishability applies only to
sensitive data. This will be captured in Deﬁnitions 3.0.8-3.0.10.
The rest of the dissertation assumes that the anonymized training data Dk is
created according to a generalization based data publishing method. We next deﬁne
the comparison classiﬁers.
Deﬁnition 3.0.6 A classiﬁer that is trained on the original training data D is called
the original classiﬁer.
Deﬁnition 3.0.7 A classiﬁer trained on the anonymized training data Dk is called
the anonymized classiﬁer.
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We go further from Deﬁnition 3.0.5, requiring that there must be multiple possible
sensitive values that could be linked to an individual. The proposed algorithms
will be centered around the following deﬁnitions. This new requirement uses
the deﬁnition of groups [11].
Deﬁnition 3.0.8 A group Gj is a subset of instances in D such that D = ∪m
j=1 Gj ,
and for any pair (Gj1 , Gj2 ) where 1 ≤ j1 6= j2 ≤ m, Gj1 ∩ Gj2 = ∅.
Next, we deﬁne the concept of `-diversity or `-diverse (multiple possible sensitive
values) for all the groups in the original training data D regarding to Xiao et al. [11].
Deﬁnition 3.0.9 A set of groups is `-diverse if and only if ∀ Gj , v ∈ ΠAs (Gj );
f req(v,Gj )
|Gj |

≤

1
`

where As is the sensitive attribute in D, ΠAs (∗) is the database As

projection operation on original training data ∗ (or on data table in the database
community), f req(v, Gj ) is the frequency of v in Gj and |Gj | is the number of instances in Gj .
We extend the data publishing method anatomization that is originally based on
`-diverse groups by Xiao et al. [11]. We should note that `-diversity comes from
Machanavajjhala et al. Xiao et al. extend this to anatomization rather than generalization [1, 11]. As we are following Xiao et al., we will be using groups rather than
the blocks of Machanavajjhala et al.
Deﬁnition 3.0.10 Given an original training data D partitioned in m `-diverse
groups according to Deﬁnition 3.0.9, anatomization produces an identifying table
IT and a sensitive table ST as follows. IT has schema
(C, A1 , ..., Ad , GID)
including the class attribute, the quasi-identifying attributes Ai ∈ IT for 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
and the group id GID of the group Gj . For each group Gj ∈ D and each instance
xi ∈ Gj , IT has an instance xi of the form:
(xi .c, xi .a1 , ..., xi .ad , j)
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ST has schema
(GID, As )
where As is the sensitive attribute in D and GID is the group id of the group Gj .
For each group Gj ∈ D and each instance xi ∈ Gj , ST has an instance of the form:
(j, xi .as )
Unlike Machanavajjhala et al., the data publishing scheme here doesn’t require
the instances in a group to generalize to the same value. This comes from Xiao et
al.’s deﬁnition of anatomization. Unlike Xiao et al., our deﬁnition of anatomization
doesn’t include the count of sensitive attributes within a group. We intend to assume
a 1-to-1 mapping between the sensitive attribute and the identifying attributes.
The IT table includes only the quasi-identifying and class attributes. Provided an
instance xi ∈ D, the class label is denoted by xi .c. We don’t consider the case where
c is sensitive, as this would make the purpose of classiﬁcation to violate privacy. c
is neither sensitive nor identifying in this dissertation, although our analysis holds
for c being an identifying attribute. We assume that direct identifying attributes are
removed before creating the IT and ST tables. We have the following observation
from Deﬁnition 3.0.10 to train a classiﬁer: every instance xi ∈ IT can be matched
to the instances xj ∈ ST within the same group using the common attribute GID in
both data tables. This observation yields the anatomized training data.
Deﬁnition 3.0.11 Given two data tables IT and ST resulting from the anatomization on original training data D, the anatomized training data DA is
DA = ΠIT.C,IT.A1 ,···IT.Ad ,ST.As ( IT 1 ST )
where 1 is the database inner join operation with respect to the condition IT.GID =
ST.GID and Π(∗) is the database projection operation on training data *.
Anatomized training data shows one of two naı̈ve data preprocessing approaches.
Another one is ignoring the sensitive attribute in ST table:
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Deﬁnition 3.0.12 Given two data tables IT and ST resulting from the anatomization on original training data D, the identifying training data Did is
Did = ΠIT.C,IT.A1 ,···IT.Ad ( IT )
where Π(∗) is the database projection operation on training data *.
Identifying training data doesn’t use all the information available in the published
data (and would likely lead to users insisting on having the original data.) The
anatomized training data (cf. Deﬁnition 3.0.11), on the other hand, is both computationally costly (a factor of ` increase in size) and noisy: for every true instance,
there are ` − 1 incorrect instances that might cause incorrect classiﬁcation. However, if the test instance comes from the original data’s distribution and the original
training data is suﬃciently large; then training a non-parametric classiﬁer from the
anatomized training data is expected to work well. In this dissertation, we propose
the following classiﬁer based on this naı̈ve preprocessing method.
Deﬁnition 3.0.13 A k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) classiﬁer that is trained on the anatomized training data DA is called the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer.
We will later show that such a naı̈ve classiﬁer will have very interesting theoretical
properties. Having ` − 1 incorrect instances for every true instance does not always
result in a bad classiﬁer if the test instance to classify does not have uncertainty
between the identifying and the sensitive information. In fact, it is theoretically
possible that anatomized k-NN classiﬁer outperforms the original k-NN despite the
uniform noise of `-diversity!
However, the naı̈ve training method of Deﬁnition 3.0.11 might be too noisy for
linear classiﬁcation. For every true instance, there are ` − 1 incorrect instances that
may not be linearly separable or that could hinder the shattering properties of the
original training data. We will propose a preprocessing algorithm to eliminate ` − 1
instances within each group to give (hopefully) a linearly separable training data (with
or without soft margin.) This gives the deﬁnition of our preprocessing proposition
for SVC and SVM: pruned training data.
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Deﬁnition 3.0.14 Given two data tables IT and ST resulting from anatomization
of the original training data D, the pruned training data DP is
DP = ΠIT.C,IT.A1 ,···IT.Ad ,ST.As (σG ( IT, ST ))

(3.2)

where σG (IT, ST ) is a pruning mechanism eliminating ` − 1 instances for all groups
G in the IT /ST pair that are unlikely to be separable (cf. Chapter 6), and Π(∗) is
the database projection operation on training data *.
We should note that the σG does not know the correct or incorrect mappings. We
will next deﬁne the proposed linear classiﬁcation method in this dissertation.
Deﬁnition 3.0.15 A linear support vector classiﬁer (SVC) that is trained on the
pruned training data DP is called the pruned SVC. Similarly, a support vector machine (SVM) that is trained on the pruned training data DP is called the pruned
SVM.
Next will be the ﬁnal deﬁnition in this chapter.
Deﬁnition 3.0.16 A classiﬁer that is trained on the identifying training data Did is
called the identifying classiﬁer.
We will give the speciﬁc deﬁnitions for the distributed DT classiﬁer in the next
chapter as the distributed learning setting is diﬀerent from the learning setting of
anatomized k-NN and the pruned SVC/SVM classiﬁers.
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4 DISTRIBUTED DECISION TREE CLASSIFICATION FOR `-DIVERSITY
In this chapter, we will consider an empirical approach for data classiﬁcation in a
distributed learning scheme. In this scheme, we assume that the data is released to
a third party for outsourcing purpose. The publisher of the data will be called client
whereas the third party will be called cloud server or server interchangeably. As
mentioned in Problem 2.1.1, the released data will be assumed to respect `-diversity.
We will consider anatomized training data for training, the test data will be neither
anatomized nor k-anonymized.
In the distributed scheme, the server is not allowed to reconstruct the original
training data whereas client is allowed to do reconstruction when needed. This will
be the motivation of the proposed algorithm in this chapter.
The chapter will be organized in the following way. Section 4.1 will present deﬁnitions speciﬁc to the distributed learning scheme in addition to the notations. Next,
the proposed distributed decision tree (DT) classiﬁer will be presented in Section
4.2.1. Section 4.3 will conclude this chapter by presenting the experimental results of
the proposed algorithm. The discussion will follow mostly Mancuhan et al. [43].

4.1 Deﬁnitions
Using the deﬁnitions 3.0.8 and 3.0.9, we will deﬁne a diﬀerent version of anatomization.
Deﬁnition 4.1.1 Given an original training data D partitioned in m `-diverse groups
according to Deﬁnition 3.0.9, anatomization produces an identifying table IT and a
sensitive table ST as follows. IT has schema
(C, A1 , ..., Ad , GID, ESEQ)
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including the class attribute, the quasi-identifying attributes Ai ∈ IT for 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
the group id GID of the group Gj and an encrypted unique sequence number ESEQ.
For each group Gj ∈ D and each instance xi ∈ Gj , IT has an instance xi of the form:
(xi .c, xi .a1 , ..., xi .ad , j, Ek (salt, s)))
ST has schema
(SEQ, GID, As )
where As is the sensitive attribute in D, GID is the group id of the group Gj and SEQ
is the unique sequence number. For each group Gj ∈ D and each instance xi ∈ Gj ,
ST has an instance of the form:
(s, j, xi .as )
Deﬁnition 4.1.1 was originally extended by Nergiz et al. [60, 61] from [11]. The
diﬀerence from Deﬁnition 3.0.10 is that it includes ESEQ and SEQ in the schema
of IT and ST respectively. Given an instance xi ∈ IT , the publisher of the data can
decrypt Ek (salt, s) to obtain the speciﬁc s value and match it with the s value in the
group Gj of ST table. Here, the same s value in ST table would indicate the correct
match of the sensitive attribute among ` potential values. The publisher of the data
can reconstruct the original data form the tables IT and ST .
The distributed decision decision tree algorithm assumes that a client outsources
its training data to a cloud server according to the Deﬁnition 4.1.1. The client can
therefore reconstruct the original training data from the anatomized training data or
the subsamples of the original training data from the subsamples of the anatomized
training data. Next, we will describe the deﬁnitions speciﬁc to the distributed DT
classiﬁer for `-diversity.
Deﬁnition 4.1.2 Given two partitions IT and ST of anatomized training data DA ,
the base decision tree (BDT) classiﬁer is a decision tree classiﬁer that is built from
the attributes A1 , · · · , Ad ∈ IT . Given a BDT classiﬁer that has leaves Γ; every leaf
γ ∈ Γ has instances in the following format:
(xi .c, xi .a1 , ..., xi .ad , j, Ek (salt, s)))
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Deﬁnition 4.1.3 Given a base decision tree BDT and the leaves Γ ∈ BDT ; a leaf
γ ∈ Γ is called reﬁned leaf if and only if it points to a sub-tree rooted at γ that is
encrypted (using symmetric key encryption).
We will elaborate in the privacy discussion of the next section how and why a
base decision tree has encrypted sub-trees.
Deﬁnition 4.1.4 Given a base decision tree BDT , the leaves Γ ∈ BDT ; a leaf γ ∈ Γ
is called unreﬁned leaf if and only if it doesn’t point to a sub-tree rooted at γ.
The basic diﬀerence between an identifying DT classiﬁer and the BDT is that BDT
has pointers to the subtrees within each leaf that might eventually point to a speciﬁc
subtree. Rigorously speaking, a BDT which has all unreﬁned leaves is identical to an
identifying DT classiﬁer in Deﬁnition 3.0.16.

4.2 Distributed Decision Tree Classiﬁer
As we have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, we have a client server
scenario which is one of the basic cases of distributed architecture. The data is kept
on the server side respecting `-diversity through anatomization whereas the client can
retrieve the data and reconstruct the original data. Thus, we propose a distributed
decision tree algorithm that involves both parties: client and server.
The idea is very simple. In a nutshell, we let the server learn a BDT classiﬁer
with all unreﬁned leaves and let the client create a reﬁned leaf from the unreﬁned leaf
while it is making a prediction on the test data. In some sense, this is an “on-the-ﬂy”
learning algorithm which builds parts of the model while the prediction process is
going on. Our objective is to reduce the runtime cost of training for the client while
keeping the predictive power high.
Next, we will explain the algorithm in detail. Section 4.2.2 will discuss the preservation of `-diversity and Section 4.2.3 will conclude the discussion with costs for the
client.
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4.2.1 Algorithm
Given an anatomized training data DA satisfying Deﬁnition 4.1.1 that is stored on
the cloud server, the cloud server builds a BDT classiﬁer with respect to Deﬁnition
4.1.2. Then, the BDT leaves Γ are improved by the client. For every leaf γ ∈ Γ, the
improvement is a sub-tree learned by the client. The client uses the instances in leaf
γ to learn an improved sub-tree and eventually γ becomes a reﬁned leaf of the BDT
(cf. Deﬁnition 4.1.3). Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 give pseudo code of distributed DT
classiﬁer algorithm involving both parties server and client. Throughout the pseudo
codes, we assume that both client and server know each other’s ip addresses.

Main():
begin:
BDT:= LearnDT(IT)
while(TRUE):
begin:
𝑥:=getInstance(client_ip)
FindBDTLeaf(BDT,𝑥)
end
end

Figure 4.1.: Distributed DT Classiﬁer Main Function (Called by Server)

Figure 4.1 shows the Main() function that is called by server to initiate distributed
DT learning. The LearnDT(IT) function call builds the BDT from the IT partition.
The client improvements on the BDT are made on the ﬂy when doing predictions. To
make a prediction for an instance x, the client sends (x.a1 , · · · , x.ad ) to the server.
getInstance() function call receives the instance x. FindBDTLeaf(BDT,x) function
is called by server for every x once x is received.
Figure 4.2 shows the FindBDTLeaf() function that is called by the server within
the function Main(). This function is essentially the interaction point between client
and server for the potential improvements to make a leaf reﬁned. This function ﬁnds
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FindBDTLeaf(BDT,𝑥):
Input:
BDT: base decision tree on server
𝑥: predicted instance
begin:
𝛾:=findLeaf(BDT,𝑥)
if(𝛾.hasEncryptedSubtree()==TRUE):
begin:
encrSubtree:=𝛾.getEncryptedSubtree()
sentMessage(encrSubtree)
end
else:
begin:
leafIns:=𝛾.getInstances()
leafIns:=joinTables(leafIns,ST,GID)
sendMessage(leafIns)
end
end

Figure 4.2.: Distributed DT Classiﬁer FindBDTLeaf Function (Called by Server)

the appropriate BDT leaf γ ∈ Γ for the client to improve (if not already done) and
sends leaf γ to the client. Given test instance x and the BDT, the findLeaf(BDT,x)
function call ﬁnds the respective leaf γ ∈ Γ using a usual decision tree inference with
attribute values (x.a1 , · · · , x.ad ). Then, FindBDTLeaf veriﬁes if γ points to an encrypted sub-tree that was previously learned by a client (if statement in pseudocode).
(The subtree is encrypted to ensure privacy constraints are satisﬁed, this will be discussed in more detail later) If γ points to an encrypted sub-tree, it sends to the client
the encrypted sub-tree as a response message (sentMessage(encrSubTree) function
call). Otherwise, server sends the tuples belonging to γ (sentMessage(leafIns)
function call). Note that there is a function call joinTables(leafIns, ST, GID)
before sending the instances of the leaf. This function matches every instance x ∈ γ
with all ` potential sensitive attributes using the GID ﬁeld as the join key (a grouplevel join, giving all possible instances provided the `-diverse dataset, not just the
true matching values which the server doesn’t know). The client will be responsible
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for ﬁnding the correct matching sensitive attribute for every instance x ∈ γ and use
this to make further splits from the leaf γ.
Inference(server_ip,𝑥,key):
Input:
server_ip: ip address of server
𝑥: predicted instance
key: encryption key
Output:
clsLbl: class label predicted
begin:
sendInstance(server_ip,𝑥)
message:=receiveMessage(server_ip)
if(message==encrTree):
begin:
subTree:=decipherTree(encrTree, key)
𝛾 ′ :=findLeaf(subTree,𝑥)
leafIns:=𝛾 ′ .getInstances()
clsLbl:=majorityLabel(leafIns)
end
if(message==leafIns):
begin:
instances:=trueInstances(leafIns,ST)
subTree:=learnDT(instances)
encrSubtree:=encryptTree(subTree,key)
updateBDT(server_ip, encrSubtree)
𝛾 ′ :=findLeaf(subTree, 𝑥)
leafIns:=𝛾 ′ .getInstances()
clsLbl:=majorityLabel(leafIns)
end
return clsLbl
end

Figure 4.3.: Distributed DT Classiﬁer Inference Function (Called by Client)

Figure 4.3 shows the Inference() function that is called by the client. Client
makes predictions on the ﬂy improvements using the Inference() function. It sends
a test instance x (only with attributes (x.a1 , · · · x.ad )) to the cloud server using
sendInstance() function. Then, client calls receiveMessage() to receive message
sent by function FindBDTLeaf(). As mentioned in the FindBDTLeaf() discussion
(cf. Figure 4.2), the message can be either an encrypted sub-tree (encrTree) or
instances of leaf γ (leafIns). leafIns is in fact all instances of γ such that every
instance is matched with all ` potential sensitive attribute values. If the message is
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an encrypted sub-tree, Inference() just decrypts the encrypted sub-tree using the
decipherTree() function, ﬁnds the appropriate leaf γ 0 as in regular tree inference using the findLeaf() function, and predicts the class label of test instance x by taking
majority of the class labels in γ 0 using the majorityLabel() function. If message is
leafIns, the Inference() function reconstructs the original instances (instances)
from leafIns using ESEQ and SEQ in Deﬁnition 4.1.1. This operation is done
in function call trueInstances(). Nergiz et al. explains in detail how this reconstruction works in the context of a data outsourcing scenario in the client server
model [60, 61]. To summarize, the client decrypts the encrypted sequence numbers
ESEQ in identifying attributes of leafIns to ﬁnd true sequence numbers and eliminates the instances of leafIns that don’t have sensitive table sequence numbers SEQ
the same as the true sequence numbers. After this reconstruction, Inference() learns
a sub decision tree (subTree) from instances using the learnDT() function, encrypts
subTree (encryptTree() function call) and sends subTree back to the server. Server
stores client’s encrypted subtree for future predictions. Finally, Inference() ﬁnds
the appropriate leaf γ 0 as in regular tree inference using the findLeaf() function and
predicts the class label of instance x by taking majority of the class labels in γ 0 using
majorityLabel() function.

4.2.2 Privacy Preservation
We now discuss the preservation of `-diversity at the cloud server after learning the
distributed DT classiﬁer. The learning algorithm in Section 4.2.1 has two inference
channels through the learning process:
1. The cloud server learns a BDT.
2. The client, owner of the data, creates reﬁned leaves from the unreﬁned leaves
of BDT.
The preservation of `-diversity here involves whether any true match between IT
and ST occurs after the two steps above. For step 1, there is no revealed match as
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the BDT is composed of splits that are for the attributes A1 , · · · , Ad in the schema of
IT . The process doesn’t involve any matching. For step 2, the reconstruction of the
original instances within the leaf γ in BDT is done at the client. In addition, the client
encrypts the learned subtree that could include splits with the sensitive attribute and
then sends it back to the server. Unless the server obtains the encryption key of the
client, it doesn’t learn any information from the encrypted subtree that it stores in
the reﬁned leaves. Hence, the `-diversity of the anatomized training data is preserved.

4.2.3 Costs for Client
The cost discussion for both training and inference of the distributed DT classiﬁer
includes multiple factors such as network communication latency cost, the encryption/decryption overheads, the computation complexity of creating splits and the
generalization ability. Here, we will focus on the computation complexity of creating
splits. As the decision trees are empirical models, we don’t discuss here the generalization ability of the distributed DT classiﬁer, unlike the other classiﬁers in the next
chapters. We will also ignore any cost incurring the server as the cloud servers are
usually assumed to have inﬁnite processing power [60, 61].
It is not possible to come up with a theoretical upper bound on the client’s training
cost in distributed DT classiﬁer that is tighter than the upper bound of client’s
training cost in the original DT classiﬁer. As the leaves Γ of BDT must have fewer
instances than the entire original training set and some good predictors in IT must
have been used in building the BDT, the client’s training cost of distributed DT
classiﬁer should be less than the training cost of original DT classiﬁer. On the other
hand, if all the identifying attributes in IT are bad predictors of the class label, then
BDT wouldn’t have many splits, maybe not even one split. In this case, it would be
more meaningful for the client to just learn an original DT classiﬁer itself.
The inference cost has similar issues to the training cost in terms of theoretical
upper bounds. If the identifying attributes in the IT table are good predictors, the
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BDT would already have some signiﬁcant generalization ability. In the end, the
reﬁned leaves created by clients wouldn’t have many splits other than the sensitive
attribute itself (maybe not even that). Therefore, the length of inference path in
distributed DT classiﬁer would be mostly located at server. The length of inference
path in the distributed DT classiﬁer would be less than the original DT classiﬁer
one’s length for the client. If the identifying attributes in IT are bad predictors, the
client would have to do the splits using the sensitive attribute and the length of the
inference path in distributed DT classiﬁer wouldn’t be much less than the length of
inference path in the original DT classiﬁer.

4.3 Experiments and Results
In the experiments, we will be comparing the distributed DT classiﬁer with the
original DT classiﬁer and identifying DT classiﬁer. We will start discussion by prerequisites. We will then discuss about the results.

4.3.1 Prerequisites
Datasets
We are testing the distributed DT classiﬁer on four datasets of the UCI repository
[62].
1. The Adult dataset is composed of US census data. An individual’s income is
the class attribute (more than 50K vs less than 50K). It has 48842 tuples where
each tuple has 15 attributes. Here, the sensitive attribute is considered to be
the attribute age and relationship in diﬀerent experiments. We also considered individuals in non-private work class, so the experiments are made on a
subsample of 14936 instances.
2. The Vote dataset contains 485 tuples where each tuple has 16 binary attributes.
An attribute is the vote of a senator in a session. A senator’s party aﬃliation is
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the class attribute (Democrat vs. Republican). Here, the attribute for the vote
session physician freeze is considered a sensitive attribute.
3. The Autos datasets contains 205 tuples where each tuple has 26 attributes.
The class label is either symboling (risk rating) or the price of a car. The autos
datasets continuous attributes are discretized in our experiments and a binary
class label is created from price of a car (low price vs. high price). The attribute
symboling (risk rating) is set as the sensitive attribute.
4. The Australian credit dataset has 690 tuples where each tuple has 16 attributes.
The class attribute is whether a credit application is approved or not (+ vs. −).
The sensitive attribute in our experiments is set to A9.
While privacy may not be a real issue for some of these datasets, we chose these
four datasets because they are large enough to demonstrate performance diﬀerences,
and reasonably challenging for decision tree learning. True privacy-sensitive data
is hard to obtain and make public experiments on, precisely because it is privacysensitive.

Privacy Setup
The anatomization was done according to Xiao et al.’s bucketization algorithm
[11]. When the `-diversity condition is not satisﬁed, the instances were divided into
groups of size ` according to the original bucketization algorithm. Leftover instances
were suppressed (not used in training models). The ` value was set to 2 in the
experiments.
The sensitive attributes were chosen such that these attributes have the most
signiﬁcant predictor power for the class attribute. In the experiments, we wanted to
simulate the worst case for the models in terms of the sensitive attributes’ predictive
power. The only exception here is the attribute relationship in adult dataset which is
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a moderate predictor of the class attribute. The objective here was to see the eﬀect
of diﬀerent sensitive attributes with diﬀerent predictive power on a ﬁxed dataset.

Model Evaluation Setup
10-fold cross validation is done on all the datasets and the accuracy was measured.
Weka J48 is used for decision tree learning with reduced error pruning [63]. 20% of the
training sets are used for reduced error pruning. Given a training/test pair of 10-fold
cross validation, the prune set is chosen randomly once so that the original, distributed
and identifying DT classiﬁer are compared within the same model space (same pruning
set and training set for diﬀerent types of DT classiﬁers). The experiments on vote
and australian credit datasets learn binary decision trees whereas the experiments
on auto and adult datasets learn non-binary decision trees. Experiments are done
using a physically remote server; and a laptop with Intel i5 processor and 4 GB
RAM. Internet connection speed was 100 Mbps. AES-128 is chosen for symmetric
key encryption.
In the distributed DT classiﬁer, we also measure memory savings and execution
time savings for a client. We will deﬁne below these evaluation metrics.
distributed DT classif ier execution time
original DT classif ier execution time

(4.1)

distributed DT classif ier memory requirement
original DT classif ier memory requirement

(4.2)

ets =

ms =

Equations 4.1 and 4.2 calculate execution time savings (ets) and memory savings
(ms) respectively in the experiments. Savings are maximized as both formulas approach to zero. In contrary, savings are minimized as both formulas approach to
1. Execution times (Eq. 4.1) include client’s encryption/decryption, network and
learning/inference costs on a training set and test set pair (ith iteration of cross validation). In equation 4.2, the number of tuples in training set is the original DT
classiﬁer’s memory requirement whereas the number of tuples in the BDT’s biggest
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leaf is the distributed DT classiﬁer’s memory requirement. Since the client learns
sub-trees on the ﬂy from the unreﬁned leaves, the biggest leaf is the memory upper
bound.

4.3.2 Analysis of Results
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Figure 4.4.: Execution Time Savings as a Fraction of Original DT Time

Figures 4.4 and 4.5 provide box plots showing elapsed time and memory savings
measurements on each of the 10 folds. Identifying DT classiﬁer is not shown, as the
client cost is 0. The blue dots on the boxplots show the mean time and memory
savings. Savings graphs exhibit visually the tradeoﬀ between ms and ets. Given a
dataset, if the memory savings are high, the time requirements are low (as expected).
This is expected since the high ms indicates a complex BDT in distributed DT classiﬁer. The client needs to do more improvement in distributed DT classiﬁer since the
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leaf provided is already a bad predictor. In addition, high ms and low ets can lead
to complex decision trees that can produce overﬁtting. On the other hand, low ms
indicate a simple BDT in distributed DT classiﬁer. Little remains to be done at the
client since the leaf provided is already a good predictor.
Figure 4.6 provides measured prediction accuracies in the experiments. On average, the original DT classiﬁers have the best accuracy, as expected. Identifying
DT classiﬁers have the worst accuracy and distributed DT classiﬁers are generally
somewhere between. This accuracy trend is expected since identifying DT classiﬁers are identical to the BDT in distributed DT classiﬁer. So, the distributed DT
classiﬁer’s accuracy values show the eﬀect of client improvements which are done to
the identifying DT classiﬁer. The exception is in the experiment with adult dataset
where the sensitive attribute is relationship. The sensitive attribute is a moderate
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predictor. This exceptional case shows that the distributed DT classiﬁer becomes too
complex after client improvement (overﬁtting). Execution time savings and memory
savings graphs justify this observation (Figures. 4.4 and 4.5). A possible solution to
avoid distributed DT classiﬁer overﬁtting is a memory savings threshold (threshold
for BDT leaf size on server). However, it is hard to deﬁne an exact threshold value.
Given a ﬁxed training set on server, distributed DT classiﬁer can be learned with
various BDT thresholds. The threshold having the best accuracy on the pruning set
can be chosen and client improvements can be applied on this model.
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5 NON-PARAMETRIC CLASSIFICATION FOR `-DIVERSITY
In this chapter, we will consider a theoretical approach for data classiﬁcation in a
non-distributed learning scheme. In this scheme, we assume again that the data is
released to a third party. However, anybody who has access to this data could learn
models. We will still aim to solve the Problem 2.1.1. However, the owner of the
released data is assumed to be not involved with training models. We will present
an anatomized k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) classiﬁer that is trained on the anatomized
training data according to Deﬁnitions 3.0.10 and 3.0.13. The test data will be in
original form as before (no uncertainty of `-diversity).
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we will outline the notations and remind
the results of the theoretical analysis of original k-NN classiﬁer. In Section 5.2, the
anatomized k-NN classiﬁer will be presented in detail in addition to the theoretical
properties. Section 5.3 will conclude the chapter with the experiment results on the
publicly available datasets. The discussion expands that of Mancuhan et al. [64].

5.1 Notations
We now give the notations that will be used in the rest of this chapter. D will
denote the original training data, whereas DA will denote the anatomized training
data. D has N instances and DA has N ` instances from deﬁnition 3.0.11. All instances
are i.i.d whether they are in training or test data. The total number of attributes are
assumed to be d + 1 (d identifying attributes and 1 sensitive attribute.) For the sake
of simplicity, Aid will denote the identifying attributes A1 · · · Ad ∈ IT . T stands for
test data which are not processed by any anatomization and generalization method.
x will be an instance of the test data T . d(U, V ) is the quadratic distance metric for
a pair of instances U and V in metric space M ⊂ Rd+1 . x0N (k) denotes the set of k
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nearest neighbors of x in D that the original k-NN classiﬁer uses while x0N ` (k) denotes
the set of k nearest neighbors of x in DA that the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer uses.
xi will interchangeably be an instance of D or DA and xj will interchangeably be an
instance of x0N (k) or x0N ` (k). In case of k = 1, we will use x0N and x0N ` for the nearest
neighbors in D and DA . X is the random variable with probability distribution P (X)
from which x and xi are drawn. Training and test instances will be column vectors in
format of (A1 , ..., Ad , As )T . C is the class attribute in D and DA with binary labels 1
and 2.
We also recall the notations from the statistical pattern recognition that will be
used in the theoretical analysis [65]. In the probability notations and proofs, we will
abuse x to represent X = x. Given the training data D and the class label i; qi (x),
Pi (x) and Pi stand for the posterior probability, the likelihood probability and the
prior probability respectively. If the anatomized training data DA is used, qAi (x),
PAi (x) and PAi are the symmetric deﬁnitions for the class label i. When ∀ x ∈ T
hold, the probability of classifying x incorrectly will be referred to an error rate.
R(x0N (k), x) is the error rate when x ∈ T is classiﬁed using x0N (k). If x0N ` (k) is used
to classify x, RA (x0N ` (k), x) will be the error rate. When ∀ xj ∈ x0N (k); xj ∼
= x hold,
we denote the error rate by Rk (x) in (5.1).
k+1/2

X 1 2i − 2
R (x) =
[q1 (x)q2 (x)]i
i
i
−
1
i=1


1 k+1
[q1 (x)q2 (x)]k+1/2
+
2 k + 1/2
k

(5.1)

k
k
RA
(x) is the error rate when ∀ xj ∈ x0N ` (k); xj ∼
(x) can trivially be
= x holds. RA

derived from (5.1) by substituting qi (x) with qAi (x). For all x ∈ T , the smallest
error rate that could be obtained from the best possible classiﬁer will be referred by
∗
(x)
Bayesian error [65]. The Bayesian errors given x are denoted by R∗ (x) and RA
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0
∼
when ∀ xj ∈ x0N (k); xj ∼
= x and ∀ xj ∈ xN
` (k); xj = x hold respectively. (5.2)

computes R∗ (x).
R∗ (x) = min{q1 (x), q2 (x)}


∞
X
1 2i − 2
∼
[q1 (x)q2 (x)]i
=
i
i
−
1
i=1

(5.2)

∗
RA
(x) can trivially be derived again from (5.2) by substituting qi (x) with qAi (x). Rk
k
k
and RA
, which are the respective expectations of Rk (X) (E{Rk (X)}) and RA
(X)
k
(E{RA
(X)}) with respect to X, will stand for the error rate of original k-NN and
∗
anatomized k-NN classiﬁers respectively. R∗ and RA
, which are the respective expec∗
∗
tations of R∗ (X) (E{R∗ (X)}) and RA
(X) (E{RA
(X)} ) with respect to X, will stand

for the Bayesian errors of the original training data and anatomized training data re1
(x) by R(x) and RA (x) for convenience.
spectively. We will denote R1 (x) and RA
1
.
Similarly, R and RA will denote R1 and RA

We ﬁnish this section with the assumptions in the theoretical analysis. We assume
that all the training data has a smooth probability distribution. Although anatomization requires a discrete probability distribution for the sensitive attribute As , such
smoothness violation is negligible since the original k-NN classiﬁer is known to ﬁt well
on discrete training data [66]. The sensitive attribute As is assumed to be non-binary.
The binary case would be meaningless in reality for `-diversity since ` can only be
2, implying a coin ﬂip privacy guarantee on the sensitive attribute. The anatomized
k-NN is assumed to have odd k values, because even k values encompass the tie cases
among x0N (k) and x0N ` (k) that make the bounds ambiguous and complicated [65]. All
instances are assumed to be in a separable metric space M ⊂ Rd+1 following Cover
et al., Devroye et al. and Fukunaga et al. [65, 67, 68]. Last, the theoretical analysis
will assume that the original training data D satisﬁes `-diversity condition and that
every group has ` instances in the creation of anatomized training data DA from the
original training data D. If this assumption is violated in practice, we will be using
suppression.
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Figure 5.1.: Training Data Example

5.2 Anatomized k-NN Classiﬁer
5.2.1 Illustration
We will illustrate the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer through the example in Figure
5.1. Although the example is for an anatomized 3-NN classiﬁer, the procedure is
general for any “k” value (cf. Deﬁnition 3.0.13.)
Figure 5.1(a) shows the original training data with six instances: two instances
of a blue class (on the left side) and four of a red class (on the right side), with two
attributes A1 and A2 . A1 is identifying attribute and A2 is sensitive attribute. Here,
every instance has a diﬀerent shape color since it belongs to a unique individual with
unique A1 value. Figure 5.1(b) shows the anatomized training data created from
IT (A1 , GID) and ST (GID, A2 ) when ` = 2 (cf. Deﬁnitions 3.0.10 and 3.0.11.) Note
that each point is duplicated with two possible values for A2 . It has 12 instances in
total.
Figure 5.2 shows the anatomized 3-NN classiﬁer in the toy example. To classify an
unlabeled test instance (black + in Figure 5.2(a)), the anatomized 3-NN classiﬁer ﬁnds
3 instances from the anatomized training data that are closest to the test instance.
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Figure 5.2.: Anatomized 3-NN Classiﬁer Example

In Figure 5.2(b), the 3 points that are located in the green circle are the 3 closest
points to the test instance. Since the test instance’s true class label is red, we obtain
the true classiﬁcation despite using 2 noisy instances (incorrect matches) and 1 true
instance (correct match.) Since the training data is separable in the toy example and
the test instance comes from the subspace where the red instances are clustered, the
correct classiﬁcation is obtained despite the distortion of `-diversity.
Note that the `-diversity’s distortion might be much more critical in practice than
our toy example’s. For example, such distortion could transform the linearly separable
original training data to non-linearly separable anatomized training data. This could
hence result in incorrect classiﬁcations as the distortion changes the likelihood probabilities that deﬁne the generalization error of any non-parametric classiﬁer. As long
as the `-diversity’s distortion on the likelihood probabilities is minimized, the generalization ability of anatomized k-NN is likely to be same as the original k-NN’s. Before
elaborating on the theoretical aspects of `-diversity’s perturbation, we will discuss
the implementation details and complexity, and the preservation of `-diversity.
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5.2.2 Implementation
The anatomized k-NN classiﬁer has two phases of implementation. First is the
creation of the anatomized training data whereas the second phase is the implementation of the original k-NN classiﬁer to train on the anatomized training data. The
ﬁrst phase is the inner join operation between the IT and ST tables and the projection operation on the former inner join result (cf. Deﬁnition 3.0.11.) The inner
join operation can be implemented in O(N logN ) time whereas the projection operation can be implemeted in O(N ). Hence, the anatomized training data creation
can be implemented in O(N logN ) time [69]. The second phase is the k-NN classiﬁer implementation. The naı̈ve approach of ﬁnding the exact k neighbors requires
going through the entire anatomized training data which takes O(N ` (d + 1)) time.
LSH based algorithms, on the other hand, can compute the c-approximate k nearest
neighbors in k

1
c2

+ O(k log[

log N `
1

log 3 N `

]) time [70].

5.2.3 Privacy Preservation
Correct or incorrect classiﬁcation from the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer doesn’t help
an adversary learn additional information about the sensitive attribute’s distribution
within a group. It is possible to have a correct classiﬁcation from the k closest training
instances even if these are all incorrect matches. In addition, the original training
data might be linearly separable whereas the anatomized training data could be
linearly inseparable. Anatomized k-NN classiﬁer just uses k “plausible” instances in
the anatomized training data which is more biased according to `-diversity’s distortion
(cf. Section 5.2.4). Thus, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer preserves `-diversity.

5.2.4 Theoretical Analysis
We will analyze the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer in terms of the asymptotical error
rate bounds (inﬁnite size training data), error rate convergence on the ﬁnite size
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training data, and the generalization error. The analysis is based on that of Cover et
al. and Fukunaga [65, 67], extended to address `-diversity.
The convergence analysis will be limited to the anatomized NN classiﬁer since
the original k-NN classiﬁer is analyzed only for 1 and 2 neighbors. The analysis of 2
neighbors is omitted here since it directly follows the 1 neighbor case.
The generalization error will follow the non-parametric density estimation classiﬁer to keep the discussion easy to follow. The analysis result is general for k-NN
classiﬁers and any density based non-parametric classiﬁer [65].

Asymptotic Error Rate Bounds
We will ﬁrst show the error bounds for the anatomized NN classiﬁer. We will then
discuss the extension to the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer for all odd k > 1. Corollary
5.2.1 expresses formally the convergence of the nearest neighbor which is critical for
the error bounds of the anatomized NN classiﬁer.
Corollary 5.2.1 Let x ∈ T and x1 , · · · , xN ∈ D be i.i.d instances taking values
separable in any metric space M ⊂ Rd+1 . Let x0N be the nearest neighbor of x in D.
Then, lim x0N = x with probability one [67].
N →∞

Proof Let Sx (r) = {x̄ ∈ M : d(x, x̄) ≤ r} be the sphere with radius r > 0 centered
at x. Let’s consider that x has a sphere Sx (r) with non-zero probability. Therefore,
for any radius δ > 0;
lim P { min d(xi , x) ≥ δ} = lim [1 − P (Sx (δ))]N = 0

N →∞

i=1,··· ,N

N →∞

(5.3)
■

Basically, Corollary 5.2.1 says that if the original training data has an inﬁnite
number of instances, it is guaranteed to ﬁnd the nearest neighbor of a test instance
that is drawn from the same probability distribution.
Obviously, the nearest neighbor could have either a correct or an incorrect sensitive attribute if we use the anatomized training data instead of the original training
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data. Although the sensitive attribute value could change the speciﬁc instance which
becomes the nearest neighbor in terms of the distance, there would still be a nearest
neighbor if the original has an inﬁnite number of instances. Finding the nearest neighbor from the anatomized training data is equivalent to ﬁnding the nearest neighbor
from D where one attribute value is swapped in the multivariate distribution. Next,
Theorem 5.2.1 shows the error bounds of the anatomized NN classiﬁer under this
assumption from Corollary 5.2.1.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let M ⊂ Rd+1 be a metric space. Let PA1 (x) and PA2 (x) be the
likelihood probabilities of x such that PA (x) = PA1 PA1 (x) + PA2 PA2 (x) with class
priors PA1 and PA2 . Finally, we assume that x is either a point of non-zero probability
measure or a continuity point of PA1 (X) or PA2 (X) with probability 1 [67]. Then, the
nearest neighbor has the probability of error RA with the bounds
∗
∗
RA
≤ RA ≤ 2RA

(5.4)

∗
where RA
denotes the Bayesian error when the anatomized training data DA is used.

We now give a sketch of proof for Theorem 5.2.1. Let RA (x0N ` , x) denote the
probability of error for a pair of instances x ∈ T and x0N ` ∈ DA . From Corollary
5.2.1, we can assume that lim x0N ` = x always hold. Using the assumptions of the
N →∞

theorem and (5.1), with k = 1 and qAi (x) instead of qi (x), (5.5) holds with probability
1.
lim RA (x0N ` , x) ∼
= RA (x) = 2qA1 (x)qA2 (x)

N →∞

(5.5)

The rest of the derivation follows Cover et al. using (5.1), (5.2) [67].
Extending (5.4) from the anatomized NN classiﬁer to the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer for all odd k > 1 follows the steps in Corollary 5.2.1 and Theorem 5.2.1. The
key is to show that lim xj = x holds for all xj ∈ x0N ` (k). The rest is to derive an
N →∞

expression of

k
RA
(x)

k
as in (5.5) for all odd k > 1 and show that RA
(x) is always less

k−2
∗
than 2RA
and RA
(x). This can be derived following the analysis of original k-NN

classiﬁer in Fukunaga [65]. The anatomized k-NN classiﬁer has the bound (5.6).
∗
5
3
∗
≤ · · · ≤ RA
≤ RA
≤ RA ≤ 2RA
∀ odd k > 1; RA

(5.6)
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∗
Note that the Bayesian errors RA
and R∗ are not always same due to the `-diverse

groups of the anatomization. The `-diverse groups cause new likelihood PAi (x) and
∗
thus diﬀers from (5.2), because (5.2)
eventually posterior probabilities qAi (x). RA

uses qi (x) instead of qAi (x). We will return back to this in the generalization error
discussion.

Error Rate Convergence on Finite Size Training Data
We now discuss the error rate of the anatomized NN classiﬁer when the size of
anatomized training data is ﬁnite. This error rate will let us derive the convergence
rate to the Bayesian error for the anatomized NN classiﬁer. The discussion here
won’t be generalized to the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer since the ﬁnite size training
data performance of k-NN classiﬁers are not generalized to 3 or more neighbors in
the pattern recognition literature [65, 68]. Theorem 5.2.2 extends the analysis of
Fukunaga and Fukunaga et al. [65, 71].
Theorem 5.2.2 Let M ⊂ Rd+1 be a metric space. Let’s assume that the original
training data D satisﬁes `-diversity condition and that every group has ` instances in
the creation of anatomized training data DA from the original training data D. Let
PA (X) and P (X) be the smooth density functions of x. Let PA1 (X) and PA2 (X) be
the class likelihood density functions of x. Let PA1 and PA2 be the class priors such
that PA (x) = PA1 PA1 (x) + PA2 PA2 (x). Let qA1 (x) and qA2 (x) be the smooth posterior
probability densities such that qA1 (x) + qA2 (x) = 1 and N ` → ∞. Let qA1 (x0N ` ) and
qA2 (x0N ` ) be the smooth posterior probability densities such that qA1 (x0N ` ) + qA2 (x0N ` ) =
1 and N ` 9 ∞. Let δ > 0 be the diﬀerence between qAi (x) and qAi (x0N ` ) for class
labels i = {1, 2}. Let d(x0N ` , x) be the quadratic distance with matrix A and ρ be the
calculated value of d(x0N ` , x). Let RA be the error rate of the anatomized NN classiﬁer
when N ` → ∞. Last, let RAN be the error rate of the anatomized NN classiﬁer when
N ` 9 ∞. Then,
RAN ∼
= RA + β

1
(N `)

1

2
d+1

EX {|A|− d+1 tr{AB(x)}}

(5.7)
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where β is
2

2
Γ d+1 ( d+3
)Γ( d+1
+ 1)
2
β=
π(d + 1)

(5.8)

and B(x) is
−

2

B(x) = PA d+1 (x)[qA2 (x) − qA1 (x)]
1
× [ r2 qA1 (x) + PA−1 (x)rPA (x)rT qA1 (x)]
2

(5.9)

Proof We ﬁrst deﬁne qAi (x0N ` ) in function of qAi (x) and δ.
qA1 (x0N ` ) = qA1 (x) + δ

(5.10)

qA2 (x0N ` ) = qA2 (x) − δ

(5.11)

RAN is written in function of RA and δ using (5.10) and (5.11) in (5.12)
RAN = E{qA1 (x)(qA2 (x) − δ) + qA2 (x)(qA1 (x) + δ)}

(5.12)

= RA + E[[qA2 (x) − qA1 (x)]δ]
where E[[qA2 (x) − qA1 (x)]δ] is (5.13)
E{(qA2 (x) − qA1 (x))δ)} = EX {Eρ {Ex0N ` {[qA2 (x) − qA1 (x)]δ|ρ, x}|x}}

(5.13)

= EX {[qA2 (x) − qA1 (x)]Eρ {Ex0N ` {δ|ρ, x}|x}}.
Following Fukunaga, the last line of (5.13) requires a 3-step expectation calculation.
Step 1 gives
Ex0N ` {δ|ρ, x} ∼
=

ρ2
1
× tr{A [ r2 qA1 (x) + PA−1 (x)rPA (x)rT qA1 (x)]}
d+1
2

(5.14)

Step 2 uses (5.14) to calculate Eρ {Ex0N ` {δ|ρ, x}|x}. This eventually requires the computation of E{ρ2 }. Although the probability distribution of ρ is unknown, the probability distribution of the local region u around test instance x ∈ T including the nearest
neighbor x0N ` is known. We therefore need to formulate ρ2 in function of u2 . The
approximation of u as a function of ρ is given in (5.15).
d+1

1
π 2
u∼
= p(x) d+3 ρd+1 |A| 2
Γ( 2 )

(5.15)
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Rewriting (5.15) and taking the expectation of both sides result in (5.16).
2

Γ d+1 ( d+3
)
2

2

E{ρ } =
p

2
d+1

(x)π|A|

2

1
d+1

E{u d+1 }

(5.16)

2

(5.17) computes E{u d+1 }.
Z
Z 1
2
u d+1 Pu (u)du = N `
0

1

2

u d+1 (1 − u)N `−1 du =

2
Γ( d+1
+ 1)Γ(N ` + 1)

Γ(N ` +

0

2
d+1

+ 1)

(5.17)

Replacing the result of (5.17) in (5.16) gives (5.18).
2

2

E{ρ } =

2
Γ d+1 ( d+3
)Γ( d+1
+ 1)
2

p

2
d+1

(x)π|A|

1
d+1

Assuming N and d have values large enough,

Γ(N ` + 1)
2
Γ(N ` + d+1
+ 1)

Γ(N `+1)
2
Γ(N `+ d+1
+1)

(5.18)

is approximated in (5.19).

Γ(N ` + 1)
N`
Γ(N `)
1
∼
=
=
2
2
2 ×
2
Γ(N ` + d+1 + 1)
N ` + d+1
Γ(N ` + d+1 )
(N `) d+1

(5.19)

Replacing the result of (5.19) in (5.18) results in (5.20).
2

E{ρ } ∼
=
2

2
Γ d+1 ( d+3
)Γ( d+1
+ 1)
2

p

2
d+1

(x)π|A|

1
d+1

1

(5.20)

2

(N `) d+1

Using (5.20) in Eρ {Ex0N ` {δ|ρ, x}|x} results in
Eρ {Ex0N ` {δ|ρ, x}| x} ∼
=β

1

−

1

2

2

|A|− d+1 × tr{A PA d+1 (x)

(N `) d+1
1
× [ r2 qA1 (x) + PA−1 (x)rPA (x)rT qA1 (x)]}
2

(5.21)

where β is (5.22).
2

2
Γ d+1 ( d+3
)Γ( d+1
+ 1)
2
β=
(5.22)
π(d + 1)
Step 3 uses (5.21) to calculate the last line of (5.13). Rewriting results in (5.23)

EX {[qA2 (x)−qA1 (x)] Eρ {Ex0N ` {δ|ρ, x}|x}} ∼
=β

1
(N `)

1

2
d+1

EX {|A|− d+1 tr{AB(x)}}
(5.23)

where B(x) is (5.24)
1
− 2
B(x) = PA d+1 (x)[qA2 (x) − qA1 (x)] × [ r2 qA1 (x) + PA−1 (x)rPA (x)rT qA1 (x)].
2
(5.24)
Replacing (5.23) in (5.12) and rewriting (5.12) yields (5.7).
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From Theorem 5.2.3, we see that the anatomized NN classiﬁer has a faster convergence rate than the original NN classiﬁer’s (O( N1` ) vs O( N1 ).) This is a surprising
result despite the `-diversity condition. However, we still don’t know what kind of
error rate (RA ) the anatomized NN classiﬁer is converging to. Formally, we need to
compare the bounds of error rate RA to the bounds of error rate R. The generalization error analysis will elaborate this comparison through non-parametric density
estimation classiﬁer.

Generalization Error Analysis
In pattern recognition literature, the generalization ability of any classiﬁer is deﬁned through the classiﬁer’s Bayesian error estimation ability [65, 68, 72]. This is
reasonable for k-NN classiﬁers as well since the error rate of original or anatomized
k-NN classiﬁer is bounded by the Bayesian errors (See (5.6) for anatomized k-NN.)
In this section, the Bayesian error will be estimated for binary classiﬁcation using
non-parametric density estimation classiﬁer. Parzen density estimation will be used
with mixed kernel function [65]. This approach is chosen because its derivation is
easier and more readable than the k-NN density estimation’s one. The analysis,
which follows Fukunaga [65] and Fukunaga et al. [73], is general enough for any
non-parametric density estimation classiﬁer including k-NN [65]. The multi-label
classiﬁcation is ignored since its theoretical work is limited for the original training
data [72]. We ﬁrst give three Axioms and a Lemma.
Axiom 5.2.1 Given the anatomized training data DA and the training data D; let
PAi and Pi be the class priors for class labels i = {1, 2}. Assume that D satisﬁes the `diversity condition and that every group has ` instances in the creation of anatomized
training data DA from the original training data D. Then, Pi = PAi .
Axiom 5.2.2 Given the anatomized training data DA and the training data D; let
PA (X.Aid ) and P (X.Aid ) be the smooth joint densities of identifying attributes Aid .
Assume that D satisﬁes `-diversity condition and that every group has ` instances in
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the creation of anatomized training data DA from the original training data D. Then,
P (X.Aid ) = PA (X.Aid ).
Axiom 5.2.3 Given the anatomized training data DA and the training data D; let
PA (X.As ) and P (X.As ) be the smooth densities of sensitive attribute As . Assume
that D satisﬁes `-diversity condition and that every group has ` instances in the
creation of anatomized training data DA from the original training data D. Then,
P (X.As ) = PA (X.As ).
Axioms 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 are obvious due to the following: provided a sample of
size N drawn from a probability distribution P , repeating every instance for ﬁxed ` > 0
times and obtaining a sample of size N ` does not change the probability distribution
P . The estimated parameters µ
b and σb2 of distribution P remain same as long as
there is no suppression.
Lemma 5.2.1 Given the anatomized training data DA and the training data D, let
identifying attributes Aid and the sensitive attribute As be independent. Let’s assume
that D satisﬁes `-diversity condition and that every group has ` instances in the
creation of anatomized training data DA from the original training data D. Then,
PA (X) = P (X) is always true under the axioms 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Using Axioms 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, the proof of Lemma 5.2.1 is straightforward. Lemma
5.2.1 and Axioms 1-to-3 yield the Theorem 5.2.3. Using Lemma 5.2.1, we will assume
∗
that RA
= R∗ holds asymptotically for Bayesian errors.

Theorem 5.2.3 Let M ⊂ Rd+1 be a metric space. Let D be an original training data
of N instances satisfying the `-diversity condition. Let DA be an anatomized training
data of N ` instances created from the instances in D with respect to the bucketization
algorithm without any leftover instances. Let xiid ∈ D denote the identifying attribute
values of a training instance xi ∈ D such that, with probability 1, every xiid ∈ DA has
ﬁxed choice of ` sensitive attribute values among the domain of sensitive attribute As .
Provided the former anatomized training data DA , let PA1 (X) and PA2 (X) be the class
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likelihood probability density functions of x. Let PA1 and PA2 be the class priors. Let
PA (X) be the smooth density function of x such that PA (x) = PA1 PA1 (x)+PA2 PA2 (x).
Provided original training data D, let P1 (X) and P2 (X) be the class likelihood probability density functions of x. Let P1 and P2 be the class priors. Let P (X) be the smooth
P

(x)

density function of x such that P (x) = P1 P1 (x) + P2 P2 (x). Let hA (x) = −ln( PAA1 (x) )
2

and h(x) = −ln( PP12 (x)
) be the density classiﬁers with biases ΔhA (x) and Δh(x) re(x)
P

spectively. Let t = ln( PAA1 ) = ln( PP12 ) be the decision threshold with threshold bias
2

Δt. Let A > 0 be the small changes on P1 (x) and P2 (x) resulting in PA1 (x) and
b∗ , R
b∗ be the Bayesian error estimations with respective biases ΔR∗ ,
PA2 (x); and R
A
A
ΔR∗ . Let PbAi (x) and Pbi (x) be the Parzen density estimations of likelihood densities;
and K(∗) be the kernel function for original training data D with shape matrix A and
size/volume parameter r [65]. Last, let’s assume the following:
1. Aid and As are independent in the original training data D and the anatomized
training data DA (independence in joint distributions, not for the distributions
with respect to class labels {1, 2}).
∗
2. RA
= R∗ hold.

3. Δt < 1.
4. The original training data D satisﬁes `-diversity condition and every group has
` instances in the creation of anatomized training data DA from the original
training data D.
The generalization error therefore has the approximation 5.25 with probability 1
r
∗ ∼
bA
R
= R∗ + a1 r2 + a2 r4 + a3

−(d+1)

N

r−(d+1)
+ A a4 r + A a5 r − A a6
N
2

(5.25)

4

where ai is an integration term. a1 r2 , a2 r4 , A a4 r2 and A a5 r4 are the bias terms
while a3 r

−(d+1)

N

and A a6 r

−(d+1)

N

are the variance terms.
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In the proof, we will use Taylor approximations up to the second order and the
negligeable terms will be ignored for convenience throughout the derivation. We
will abuse x to denote random variable x. Throughout the proof, we will derive in
detail the approximations for the class 1 and omit the details for class 2 since both
derivations are symmetric.
Proof Under the bucketization and the no leftover instances assumption, PA1 (x)
and PA2 (x) are P1 (x) + 1 and P2 (x) − 2 respectively with probability 1 where i is a
small change for any class label i = {1, 2} and 1 6= 2 . We ﬁrst write PA (x).
PA (x) = P1 PA1 (x) + P2 PA2 (x)
= P1 [P1 (x) + 1 ] + P2 [P2 (x) − 2 ]

(5.26)

= P1 P1 (x) + P2 P2 (x) + P1 1 − P2 2
= P (x) + P1 1 − P2 2
In the last line of (5.26), lemma 5.2.1 tells that PA (x) = P (x) always holds under
the theorem’s independence assumptions. Thus, (5.27) is valid
2 =

P1
1 = et 1
P2

(5.27)

when t = ln(P1 /P2 ) [65]. Let A stand for 1 in the remainder of the text. Then,
the class likelihoods are PA1 (x) = P1 (x) + A and PA2 (x) = P2 (x) − et A . Next is
the approximation of E{PbAi (x)} in function of Pi (x) and A . (5.28) approximates
R
E{PbAi (x)} using convolution and K(x)dx = 1.
Z
Z
b
E{PA1 (x)} = PA1 (Y )K1 (x − Y )dY = [P1 (Y ) + A ]K1 (x − Y )dY
Z
Z
= P1 (Y )K1 (x − Y )dY + A K1 (x − Y )dY
(5.28)
= P1 (x) ∗ K1 (x) + A
1
∼
= P1 (x) + P1 (x) α1 (x)r2 + A
2
2

i (x)
In (5.28), αi (x) is tr{ rPiP(x)
A}. Through a similar approach, we have

1
E{PbA2 (x)} ∼
= P2 (x) + P2 (x) α2 (x)r2 − et A
2

(5.29)

45
According to Fukunaga, variance is
1
V ar{PbA1 (x)} = [PA1 (x) ∗ K12 (x) − E 2 {PbA1 (x)}].
N

(5.30)

We will only use the ﬁrst order terms to keep the calculation tractable. E 2 {PbA1 (x)}
is (5.31)
[E{Pb1 (x) + A ]2 ∼
= [P1 (x) + A ]2 ∼
= P1 (x)[P1 (x) + 2A ]
R
and PA1 (x) ∗ K12 (x) is (5.32) using w1 = K 2 (x)dx.
Z
Z
2
PA1 (Y )K1 (x − Y )dY = [P1 (Y ) + A ]K12 (x − Y )dY
Z
Z
2
= P1 (Y )K1 (x − Y )dY + A K12 (x − Y )dY

(5.31)

(5.32)

= P1 (x) ∗ K12 (x) + 1 w1
∼
= w1 P1 (x) + A w1
Replacing (5.31) and the last line of (5.32) in (5.30) results in (5.33).
1
[[w1 P1 (x) + A w1 ] − [P1 (x)[P1 (x) + 2A ]]]
N
1
= [w1 P1 (x) − P12 (x) + A [w1 − 2P1 (x)]]
N
1
A
= [w1 P1 (x) − P12 (x)] + [w1 − 2P1 (x)]
N
N

V ar{PbA1 (x)} ∼
=

(5.33)

The approximation of PA2 (x) ∗ K22 (x) and E 2 {PbA2 (x)}yields (5.34).
1
A et
V ar{PbA2 (x)} ∼
[w2 − 2P2 (x)]
= [w2 P2 (x) − P22 (x)] −
N
N

(5.34)

∗
of the Bayesian error estimation is (5.35)
According to Fukunaga, the bias ΔRA
Z Z
(jω) 2
∗ ∼ 1
E[ΔhA (x) +
E[ΔRA ] =
ΔhA (x)]ejωhA (x)
2π
2
(5.35)
× [PA1 PA1 (x) − PA2 PA2 (x)]dωdx.

(5.35) requires the approximations of the expected decision function biases E{ΔhA (x)}
and E{Δh2A (x)}. E{

ΔPAi (x)
}
PAi (x)

and E{(

ΔPAi (x) 2
)}
PAi (x)

will be approximated next to approx-
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imate the former terms. E{
A
P1 (x)

ΔPA1 (x)
}
PA1 (x)

is approximately the last line of (5.36) using

< 1 and the ﬁrst order Taylor series.
E{

ΔPA1 (x)
1
}=
E{PbA1 } − 1
PA1 (x)
PA1 (x)
1
1
∼
[P1 (x) + P1 (x) α1 (x)r2 + A ] − 1
=
2
P1 (x) + A
1
1
1
1
−1
=
α1 (x)r2 +
A +
A
1 + P1 (x)
1 + P1 (x) 2
1 + P1 (x)
A

∼
=
∼
=
=
Similarly E{

ΔPA2 (x)
}
PA2 (x)

1
A 1
1
α1 (x)r2 −
[ α1 (x)r2 + 1 −
]
1 + P1A(x)
2
P1 (x) 2
1
A 1
A
α1 (x)r2 −
[ α1 (x)r2 + 1 − (1 −
)]
P1 (x)
2
P1 (x) 2
1
1 α1 (x) 2
r
α1 (x)r2 − A
2
2 P1 (x)

is (5.37).
E{

E{(

ΔPA1 (x) 2
)}
PA1 (x)

E{(

ΔPA2 (x) ∼ 1
1 α2 (x) 2
} = α2 (x)r2 + et A
r
PA2 (x)
2
2 P2 (x)

ΔPA1 (x) 2
1
1
V ar{PbA1 (x)} + 2
E 2 {ΔPA1 (x)}
) }= 2
PA1 (x)
PA1 (x)
PA1 (x)
1
2 (x) V
PA

(5.38)

1
2
2 (x) E {ΔPA1 (x)}.
PA
1
1 (x)
A
( P1P(x)+
)2 ∼
= 1 − P21 (x)
A

ar{PbA1 (x)} and

1

1

(5.37)

is (5.38)

that requires the approximation of
2 (x)
PA
1

(5.36)

V ar{PbA1 (x)} is approximated in (5.39) using

and

w1 = s1 rd+1
1
PA2 1 (x)

V ar{PbA1 (x)} ∼
=

1
[w1 P1 (x) − P12 (x)]+
N (P1 (x) + A )2
1
A
[w1 − 2P1 (x)]
N (P1 (x) + A )2
P12 (x)
w1
A w1
2A
=
[
+
−
]
2
(P1 (x) + A )2 N P1 (x) N P1 (x) N P1 (x)
w1
A w1
2A
2A
∼
][
+
−
]
= [1 −
2
P1 (x) N P1 (x) N P1 (x) N P1 (x)
s1
2
s1
∼
− A [
+
]
=
2
d+1
d+1
N P1 (x)r
N P1 (x)
N P1 (x)r
s1
s1
∼
−

=
A
2
N P1 (x)rd+1
N P1 (x)rd+1

(5.39)
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whereas

1
2
2 (x) E {ΔPA1 (x)}
PA

is approximated in (5.40).

1

1
PA2 1 (x)

1
1 α1 (x) 2 2
r )
E 2 {ΔPA1 (x)} ∼
= ( α1 (x)r2 − A
2
2 P1 (x)
1
1 α1 (x) 2
∼
r
= α12 (x)r4 − α1 (x)r2 A
4
2 P1 (x)
1 2
1 α12 (x) 4
4
= α1 (x)r − A
r
4
2 P1 (x)

(5.40)

Replacing the last lines of (5.39) and (5.40) in (5.38) results in (5.41).
E{(

ΔPA1 (x) 2 ∼
s1
s1
− A
) }=
2
d+1
PA1 (x)
N P1 (x)r
N P1 (x)rd+1
1
1 α2 (x)
+ α12 (x)r4 − A 1 r4
4
2 P1 (x)

The same derivation for E{(
E{(

ΔPA2 (x) 2
)}
PA2 (x)

(5.41)

results in (5.42).

ΔPA2 (x) 2 ∼
s2
s2
+ et A
) }=
2
d+1
PA2 (x)
N P2 (x)r
N P2 (x)rd+1
1
1 α2 (x)
+ α22 (x)r4 + et A 2 r4
4
2 P2 (x)

(5.42)

According to Fukunaga, E{ΔhA (x)} is approximately (5.43)
E{

1
ΔPA2 (x) 2
ΔPA1 (x)
1
ΔPA1 (x) 2
ΔPA2 (x)
} + E{(
) } − Δt (5.43)
} − E{(
) } − E{
2
PA2 (x)
PA1 (x)
2
PA1 (x)
PA2 (x)

and E{Δh2A (x)} is approximately (5.44) using the second order Taylor approximation.

E{(

ΔPA1 (x) ΔPA2 (x)
ΔPA2 (x) 2
ΔPA1 (x) 2
) } + E{(
) } − 2E{(
)(
)} + Δt2
PA1 (x)
PA1 (x)
PA2 (x)
PA2 (x)
ΔPA2 (x)
1
ΔPA2 (x) 2
−2Δt[E{
} − E{(
)}
2
PA2 (x)
PA2 (x)
ΔPA1 (x)
1
ΔPA1 (x) 2
− E{
} + E{(
) }]
2
PA1 (x)
PA1 (x)

(5.44)
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Replacing the result of (5.36), (5.37), (5.41) and (5.42) in (5.43) and rewriting yield
(5.45).
r2
r4
E{ΔhA (x)} ∼
= [α2 (x) − α1 (x)] + (α12 (x) − α22 (x))
2
8
−(d+1)
r
s1
s2
r2 α1 (x)
α2 (x)
+
[
−
] + A [
+ et
]
2 P1 (x)
P2 (x)
2N P1 (x) P2 (x)
r4 α2 (x)
α2 (x)
r−(d+1) s1
s2
− A [ 1
+ e t 2 ] − A
[ 2
+ et 2 ]
P2 (x)
2N P1 (x)
P2 (x)
4 P1 (x)
2
r α1 (x)
α2 (x)
+ et
]
= E{Δh(x)} + A [
P2 (x)
2 P1 (x)
r4 α2 (x)
α2 (x)
r−(d+1) s1
s2
− A [ 1
+ e t 2 ] − A
[ 2
+ et 2 ]
P2 (x)
2N P1 (x)
P2 (x)
4 P1 (x)

(5.45)

Note that the ﬁrst three terms of approximation are E{Δh(x)} according to Fukunaga
[65] and the remaining terms with A are the eﬀect of `-diversity. Replacing the result
of (5.36), (5.37), (5.41) and (5.42) in (5.44) and rewriting yield (5.46).
1
Δt 4 2
r (α1 (x) − α22 (x))
E{Δh2A (x)} ∼
= [ r2 (α2 (x) − α1 (x)) − Δt]2 −
2
4
r−(d+1) s1 (1 − Δt) s2 (1 + Δt)
α1 (x)
α2 (x)
+
[
−
] − A Δt r2 [
+ et
]
P2 (x)
P1 (x)
P2 (x)
N
P1 (x)
α1 (x)α2 (x)
r4 α1 (x)α2 (x)
+ A [
− et
]
P2 (x)
2
P1 (x)
r4 α2 (x)(1 − Δt)
α2 (x)(1 + Δt)
− A [ 1
− et 2
]
P2 (x)
2
P1 (x)
r−(d+1) (1 − Δt)s1
(1 + Δt)s2
− A
[
+ et
]
2
P22 (x)
N
P1 (x)

(5.46)

= E{Δh2 (x)}
α2 (x)
r4 α1 (x)α2 (x)
α1 (x)α2 (x)
α1 (x)
+ et
] + A [
− et
]
P2 (x)
2
P1 (x)
P2 (x)
P1 (x)
r4 α2 (x)(1 − Δt)
α2 (x)(1 + Δt)
− et 2
]
− A [ 1
P2 (x)
2
P1 (x)
r−(d+1) (1 − Δt)s1
(1 + Δt)s2
− A
[
+ et
]
2
P22 (x)
N
P1 (x)

− A Δt r2 [

The ﬁrst three terms of the approximation are E{Δh2 (x)} according to Fukunaga [65]
and the remaining terms with A are again the eﬀect of `-diversity. Plugging the results
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of (5.45) and (5.46) in (5.35) and rewriting (5.35) give (5.25) where each ai stands
for an integration term.

■

(5.25) relies on the following intuition. Given a ﬁxed original training data that
satisﬁes the `-diversity condition without leftover instances and the bucketization
algorithm, Deﬁnition 3.0.11 always results in the same instances in the anatomized
training data. Although the groups that a given instance is assigned could be diﬀerent
in independent runs of the bucketization algorithm, the anatomized training data
always has the same set of instances without speciﬁc group information. This makes
(5.25) general for a ﬁxed original training data.
(5.25) shows that the anatomized training data DA reduces the variance term of
the non-parametric density classiﬁer that estimates the Bayesian error. This explains
the faster convergence of the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer that was derived in the previous section. Given the original training data of ﬁnite size N , using the anatomized
training data of ﬁnite size N ` reduces the search space of possible models. This means
that the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer considers fewer options for probabilistic models
than the original k-NN classiﬁer.
However, the bias term is increased which makes the non-parametric density classiﬁer more susceptible to underﬁtting. In overall, the non-parametric density classiﬁer
on the anatomized training data has a shifted bias-variance trade-oﬀ relative to the
non-parametric models on the original training data. The following conclusions can
be drawn for the generalization ability:
1. If the original k-NN classiﬁer overﬁts, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer suﬀers less
from overﬁtting provided that both classiﬁers have the same k hyper-parameter.
In this case, the anatomized k-NN always generalizes better than the original
k-NN.
2. If the original k-NN classiﬁer ﬁts well (optimum bias-variance tradeoﬀ), the
anatomized k-NN classiﬁer always underﬁts provided that both classiﬁers have
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the same k hyper-parameter. In this case, the original k-NN generalizes better
than the anatomized k-NN.
3. If the original k-NN classiﬁer underﬁts, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer suﬀers
more from underﬁtting provided that both classiﬁers have the same k hyperparameter. In this case, the original k-NN generalizes better than the anatomized k-NN as well.
The key result to keep is: `-diversity regularizes the original k-NN classiﬁer while
it provides privacy.

5.3 Experiments and Results
5.3.1 Prerequisites
Datasets
We tested our algorithm on the adult, IPUMS and marketing datasets of the UCI
data repository [62] and the fatality dataset of the Keel data repository [74]:
1. Adult: The adult dataset is drawn from 1994 census data of the United States
[62]. It is composed of 45222 instances after the removal of instances with
missing values. The binary classiﬁcation task is to predict whether a person’s
adjusted gross income is ≤ 50K or > 50K. The attribute ﬁnal weight is ignored.
Education is treated as the sensitive attribute in the experiments. The quasiidentifying attributes are age, workclass, maritalstatus, occupation, race, sex,
capitalgain, capitalloss, hoursperweek and nativecountry. The class attribute is
income.
2. IPUMS: This data is drawn from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 census data of
the Los Angeles and Long Beach areas [62]. It has 233584 instances in total.
We pick the 10 attributes that are included in the adult data. The binary
classiﬁcation task is to predict whether a person’s total income is ≤ 50K or
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> 50K. The classiﬁers are expected to show a diﬀerent behavior from the
former adult data since the population (and to some extent, classiﬁcation task,
as it is total income rather than adjusted gross income) are diﬀerent. Educrec
is treated as the sensitive attribute in the experiments. The quasi-identifying
attributes are age, sex, raceg, marst, occ1950, classwkg, hrswork2, migplac5
and vetstat. The class attribute is bintotinc, a binary attribute that we created
from the totinc (total income) of the original dataset based on the former binary
classiﬁcation task.
3. Marketing Data: This data is drawn from a phone based marketing campaign
of a Portuguese banking institution for long term deposits [62]. We created the
following binary classiﬁcation task which is linearly separable: “among all the
people who didn’t submit a long term deposit, predict whether a person has
a housing loan or not”. We performed the following preprocessing using Weka
ﬁlters [63]: 1) pick 39922 instances who didn’t make a long term deposit 2)
choose four attributes job, day, month and age using the correlation with the
class attribute housing. Discretized age is treated as the sensitive attribute
whereas the quasi-identifying attributes are job, day and month.
4. Fatality Data: This data is a U.S. National Center for Statistics and Analysis
compilation of 2001 car accidents. The original class attribute injury severity
has eight labels indicating the level of injury suﬀered [74]. We create the
binary attribute is injured with values “Injured” and “No Injury” in the following way: 1) remove the instances with labels “Injured Severity Unknown”,
“Died Prior to Accident”, “Unknown” and “Possible Injury” from the original
data. This results in 91085 instances 2) label “Injured” the instances with labels
“Nonincapaciting Evident Injury”, “Incapaciting Injury” and “Fatal Injury”.
No feature selection is applied on this dataset. The sensitive attribute is police reported alcohol involvement. The remaining attributes in the data catalog
are the quasi-identifying attributes [74].
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Privacy Setup
The anatomization was done according to Xiao et al.’s bucketization algorithm
[11]. When `-diversity condition is not satisﬁed, the instances were divided into
groups of size ` according to the original bucketization algorithm. Leftover instances
were suppressed (not used in training models.) Although this is a violation of the
assumption in the theoretical analysis, we believe such experiments will still be useful
to show whether the theoretical analysis is representation of data that violates the
assumptions.
k-anonymized training data was created for the adult dataset. The k-anonymized
k-NN is not included for other datasets since Inan et al. provided generalization hierarchies only in the adult dataset [25]. Hence, we used Inan et al.’s value generalization
hierarchies in the experiments. The privacy parameters were k = ` for k-anonymity
and `-diversity to compare the classiﬁers using same group sizes in training data.
k-anonymized and anatomized training data had the same identifying and sensitive
attributes. The sensitive attributes were chosen such that the `-diversity is satisﬁed
for at least ` = 2.

Model Evaluation Setup
Weka’s IBk class was used to train k-NN classiﬁers on the original, identifying and
anatomized training data [63]. The anatomized training data is created from the IT
and ST tables using the merging and dropping functions of Pandas [75].
10-fold cross validation was used for evaluation of the error rate bounds and generalization ability, and the error rate was used as the evaluation metric. The comparison
includes anatomized k-NN, original k-NN and identifying k-NN. The comparison on
adult dataset also includes k-anonymized k-NN due to the privacy setup in the previous section. The error rates of anatomized and original k-NN are compared using the
Student t-test. Other models are not included in Student t-test, because Theorem
5.2.3 covers only anatomized and original k-NN.
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10-fold cross validation was also used for evaluation of the NN classiﬁer’s convergence rate. The error rate was again used for the evaluation metric. However, we
trained the anatomized and original NN classiﬁers incrementally at each iteration of
the cross validation. In a given iteration, the training set was divided into 9 partitions
and the models are trained 9 times. The training started from the ﬁrst partition and
continued further by adding a partiton at a time. The average error rates are computed over 10 diﬀerent error rate values for a given training set size in the analysis
(cf. Section 5.3.2.)

5.3.2 Analysis of Results
Figures 5.3 through 5.8 show the boxplots of error rates for k-NN classiﬁers. Figure
5.9 shows the lines of convergence rate for the error rates of original and anatomized
NN classiﬁers. In Figures 5.3 to 5.8, “Org.” and “Id.” labels will stand for original
k-NN and identifying k-NN respectively. The anatomized and k-anonymized k-NN
will be represented by their respective privacy parameters (L for ` and k for k.) Our
analysis have four observation aspects:
1. Comparison between the anatomized and the original k-NN: From
Theorem 5.2.3, there are two possibilities for the error rates. In the ﬁrst possibility, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer is eﬀected from ovetiﬃng less than the
original k-NN classiﬁer. In this case, we expect that the anatomized k-NN has
smaller error rate than the original k-NN on average. In the second possibility,
the anatomized k-NN suﬀers from underﬁtting while the original k-NN classiﬁer
either ﬁts well or suﬀers less from underﬁtting. In this case, the anatomized
k-NN’s error rate is expected to be greater than the original k-NN’s. Increasing
the ` parameter would result in the increase of distortion (A in (5.25)). From
Theorem 5.2.3, the error rate expectation in the former two possibilities would
still be valid in function of the increase in ` unless there is suppression. If some
instances are suppressed to create the anatomized training data, then the theo-
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retical analysis of the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer would be invalid because the
assumption of Theorem 5.2.3 is violated.
2. Comparison between anatomized and identifying k-NN: In the ﬁrst case,
the identifying k-NN is likely to outperform the anatomized k-NN if the sensitive
attribute is a bad predictor of the class attribute in the original training data.
The sensitive attribute changes the likelihood probability in the density based
decision function and the model either overﬁts by the increase in variance or
underﬁts by the increase in the bias. The anatomized k-NN therefore estimates
a model of the original training data that is not likely to generalize well. In the
second case, the anatomized k-NN are likely to outperform the identifying k-NN
if the sensitive attribute is a good predictor of the class attribute in the original
training data. The sensitive attribute changes the likelihood probability in the
density based decision function and the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer catches a
better tradeoﬀ between the bias and the variance terms. The anatomized k-NN
classiﬁer would avoid the potential underﬁtting that the identifying k-NN could
have.
3. Comparison between the anatomized and the k-anonymized k-NN:
The anatomized k-NN are expected to outperform the k-anonymized k-NN because anatomization preserves the original values for all the attributes. The
generalization based k-anonymity, on the other hand, distorts most of the original attribute values [25].
4. Comparison of the anatomized and original NN in the convergence
rates: From Theorem 5.2.2, we expect that the anatomized NN will converge
faster than the original NN classiﬁer to the lowest possible error rate if there
is no suppression in the creation of the anatomized training data. Suppression
would again violate the assumption of Theorem 5.2.2.
We should note that we are comparing an anatomy method satisfying `-diversity
against a weaker k-anonymity requirement for the generalization-based approach.
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While we don’t speciﬁcally use an `-diversity based generalization [1], such a method
would be expected to generalize more and give worse results. The generalizationbased k-anonymization we use already produces 2-diverse datasets. More than 44000
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instances in the adult dataset are 11-diverse for k-values 2 to 5. As 97% of the
generalization based k-anonymized adult dataset satisfy `-diversity, the results should
be similar with generalization based `-diversity.
We are now presenting the analysis of error rates in ﬁrst three aspects for all the
datasets. We will then present the analysis of convergence rate for anatomized NN
in the fourth aspect.

Analysis of Error Rates for NN
Figure 5.3 shows the error rates for the original, anatomized and identifying NN
classiﬁers that are tested on the four datasets.
In Figure 5.3(a), the original NN classiﬁer outperforms the anatomized NN classiﬁer when ` is 2 and 3. The anatomized NN classiﬁer hence underﬁts more than the
original NN due to the distortion of `-diversity. In the second aspect, the sensitive
attribute is a bad predictor of the class attribute because the average error rate of the
identifying NN classiﬁer is less than the original NN’s. The anatomized NN classiﬁer’s
error rates are greater than both the original and identifying NN classiﬁer’s because
the anatomized NN classifers are estimating an original NN classiﬁer that doesn’t ﬁt
well. The former claims hold when ` is 4 and 5 despite suppression.
In Figure 5.3(b), the original NN outperforms the anatomized NN when ` is 2-to-4.
Theorem 5.2.3 concludes that the anatomized NN classiﬁer underﬁts more than the
original NN classiﬁer. In the second aspect, the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor
of the class attribute because the average error rate of the identifying and original
NN classiﬁers are almost same. The anatomized NN classiﬁer’s error rates thus are
greater than both the original and identifying NN classiﬁer’s because the anatomized
NN classifers are estimating an original NN classiﬁer that doesn’t ﬁt well. When `
is 5, the former claims hold although the assumptions of our theoretical analysis is
violated due to suppression.
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In Figure 5.3(c), the original NN classiﬁer has higher error rates than the anatomized NN classiﬁers when ` is 2-to-5. From Theorem 5.2.3, the original NN classiﬁer
suﬀers from overﬁtting whereas the anatomized NN classiﬁer catches a better bias
variance tradeoﬀ. Note that when ` is increased from 4 to 5, the error rates start
increasing. Increase in ` causes here the increase in the bias such that the anatomized
NN classiﬁer starts underﬁtting. In the second aspect, the identifying NN classiﬁer
has a much lower error rate than the original NN classiﬁer has. This means that the
sensitive attribute is a bad predictor of the class attribute. Since the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor, the anatomized NN classiﬁer approximates a bad classiﬁer
of the original training data which increases its generalization error relative to the
identifying NN classiﬁer.
In Figure 5.3(d), the original NN classiﬁer has higher error rates than the anatomized NN classiﬁers when ` is 2. From Theorem 5.2.3, the original NN classiﬁer
suﬀers from overﬁtting whereas the anatomized NN classiﬁer captures a better bias
variance tradeoﬀ. When ` is 3 or 4, the assumptions of the theoretical analysis is
violated due to suppression. The general conclusion here would be the signiﬁcant distortion of the likelihood probabilities which increases the bias term (underﬁtting). In
the second aspect, the identifying NN classiﬁer’s error rates are less than the original
NN classiﬁer’s. The sensitive attribute hence is a bad predictor of the class attribute
and the anatomized NN classiﬁer approximates a bad classiﬁer which increases its
generalization error relative to identifying NN.
Figure 5.4 gives the boxplots of error rates for k-anonymized k-NN classiﬁers in
addition to original, identifying and anatomized NN. In the third aspect, we have
the expected result for the k-anonymized NN classiﬁers. Their error rates are greater
than the anatomized NN classiﬁers. Due to generalization of the identifying attribute
values, the utility loss of the k-anonymized training data is more than the anatomized
training data’s. In the context of k-anonymized NN, note that the error rates are
decreased when k is increased. Increasing k for the k-anonymized NN classiﬁer is
same as increasing the number of neighbors for the k-NN classiﬁer.
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Analysis of Error Rates for k-NN on Adult Data
Figure 5.5 shows the results of multiple types of k-NN classiﬁers on the adult data
for 3, 5, 7 and 9 neighbors (k). In the ﬁrst aspect, we start discussion with ` = 2 and
` = 3 (no suppression cases.) The anatomized k-NN classiﬁers have higher error rates
than the original k-NN classiﬁers. Since Theorem 5.2.3 tells that the anatomized
training data increases the bias terms of the k-NN classiﬁers’ generalization error
while reducing the variance, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁers suﬀer from underﬁtting.
Although the former Theorem’s assumptions are violated in cases of ` = 4 and ` = 5,
we see that the error rates of anatomized k-NN classiﬁers are still higher than the
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original k-NN classiﬁers’. We thus can assume that the same underﬁtting behviour
continues. In the second aspect, the sensitive attribute is a good predictor of the class
attribute because the original 3-NN, 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers outperform the
identifying 3-NN, 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers in terms of the error rates. When
` = 2 and ` = 3, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁer captures the bias variance tradeoﬀ
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between the identifying and original k-NN classiﬁers for multiple values of k. The
anatomized k-NN classiﬁers outperforms the identifying k-NN classiﬁers while it is
outperformed by the original k-NN classiﬁers. Due to suppression, the former bias
variance tradeoﬀ conditions don’t hold in cases of ` = 4 and ` = 5. The anatomized
k-NN classiﬁers thus don’t have the former tradeoﬀ.
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Analysis of Error Rates for k-NN on IPUMS Data
Figure 5.6 shows the results for multiple types of k-NN classiﬁers on the IPUMS
data. The IPUMS data satisfy the `-diversity condition when ` = 2, ` = 3 and ` = 4,
so the Theorem 5.2.3 and the bound 5.5 are expected to hold in here. In the ﬁrst
aspect, the anatomized 3-NN, 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers are outperformed by
the original 3-NN, 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers. From Theorem 5.2.3, the increase
in the bias terms yields the underﬁtting classiﬁers. In the second aspect, the sensitive
attribute is a good predictor of the class attribute because the original k-NN classiﬁers
outperform the identifying k-NN classiﬁer for multiple values of hyperparameter k.
When ` = 3 and ` = 4, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁers surprisingly fail to capture
the bias variance tradeoﬀ between the original and the identifying k-NN classiﬁers.
From Theorem 5.2.3, the increase in bias is way greater to capture bias variance
tradeoﬀ for the anatomized k-NN classiﬁers (cf. Figure 5.6.) The case of ` = 2 is
special. Note that the anatomized 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers capture the bias
variance trade-oﬀ between the original and identifying ones, as expected (cf. Figures
5.6(b), 5.6(c) and 5.6(d).) For anatomized 3-NN classiﬁer, the increase in bias is way
greater than the decrease in variance. It thus fails to capture again the bias variance
tradeoﬀ between the original 3-NN and the identifying 3-NN classiﬁers (cf. Figure
5.6(a).) Last, the anatomized 3-NN, 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers under ` = 5
(suppression) show a similar trend to the anatomized 3-NN, 5-NN, 7-NN and 9-NN
classiﬁers under ` = 3 and ` = 4 in terms of the ﬁrst and second aspects.

Analysis of Error Rates for k-NN on Marketing Data
Figure 5.7 shows the result for multiple types of k-NN classiﬁers on the marketing
data. The marketing data satisfy the `-diversity condition when ` is 2-to-4. Theorem
5.2.3 and the bound 5.5 thus are expected to hold in most ` values. In the ﬁrst
aspect, the anatomized k-NN classiﬁers outperform the original k-NN classiﬁers for
all combinations of ` and hyperparameter k. This shows that the distortion of `-
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diversity reduces the generalization error by increasing the bias and reducing the
variance of the original k-NN classiﬁer (ﬁxing the overﬁtting issue.) Note that when `
is increased from 4 to 5, the overﬁtting issue is ﬁxed less because the increase in bias
exceeded the good bias variance tradeoﬀ and the model is directed to the underﬁtting
case. Besides, the training data has suppression in this case. In the second aspect, the
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sensitive attribute is a good predictor of 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers since the original 7NN and 9-NN’s error rates are less than the identifying 7-NN and 9-NN’s (cf. Figures
5.7(c) and 5.7(d).) Surprisingly, the anatomized 7-NN and 9-NN’s error rate are lower
than both the original and the identifying 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers. The sensitive
attribute, on the other hand, is a bad predictor of 3-NN and 5-NN classiﬁers since
the original 3-NN and 5-NN’s error rates are greater than the identifying 3-NN and
5-NN’s (cf. Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(b).) Surprisingly, the anatomized 3-NN and 5-NN
classiﬁer have again lower error rates than both original and identifying 3-NN and
5-NN classiﬁers. The most plausible reason is the regularization eﬀect of `-diversity
that results in the lowest generalization error of the anatomized k-NN classiﬁers for
all `-values. The distortion of `-diversity increases the bias such that it ﬁxes the
overﬁtting issue of both the original and identifying k-NN classiﬁers.

Analysis of Error Rates for k-NN on Fatality Data
Figure 5.8 shows the result for multiple types of k-NN classiﬁers on the fatality
data. As the fatality data satisfy the `-diversity condition for ` = 2, Theorem 5.2.3
thus is expected to hold in the ﬁrst aspect. Anatomized k-NN classiﬁers outperform
the original k-NN classiﬁers when ` = 2. From Theorem 5.2.3, the increase in bias
reduces the generalization error of the original k-NN classiﬁers which is overﬁtting
to the original training data. In the second aspect, the sensitive attribute is a bad
predictor of k-NN classiﬁers since the original k-NN’s error rates are greater than
the identifying k-NN’s. Although the error rates of anatomized k-NN is less than
the original k-NN’s, its error rates are greater than the identifying k-NN’s. This is
expected since the anatomized k-NN is trying to capture the bias variance tradeoﬀ
between the original and the identifying k-NN classiﬁers. The anatomized k-NN
classiﬁer is estimating the original k-NN classiﬁer’s distribution which is not the best
classiﬁer in the existing data. Last, increasing ` to 3 and 4 increases the error rates
of the anatomized k-NN classiﬁers. Due to suppression, the theoretical analysis does
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not hold here. The most plausible reason is that the reduction of the training data
size results in the overﬁtting of the models. This would increase the generalization
error.
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Analysis of Convergence Rates
Figure 5.9 shows the error rates of original and anatomized NN classiﬁers as a
function of the increasing training set sizes.
In Figure 5.9(a), we see that the anatomized NN classiﬁer converges faster than
the original NN classiﬁer on the adult data when ` = 2 and ` = 3, as expected from
Theorem 5.2.2. The former ` values satisfy the `-diversity condition, so there is no
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supression and the assumptions of the Theorem 5.2.2 are not violated. Note that the
anatomized NN classiﬁer converges slower than the original NN classiﬁer when the
assumption of Theorem 5.2.2 is violated under ` = 4 and ` = 5 (due to suppression.)
In Figure 5.9(b), we see that the anatomized NN classiﬁer converges faster than
the original NN classiﬁer on the IPUMS data when ` = 2, ` = 3 and ` = 4, as
expected from Theorem 5.2.2. The former ` values satisfy the `-diversity condition,
so there is no supression and the assumptions of the Theorem 5.2.2 are not violated.
Note that the anatomized NN classiﬁer still converges faster than the original NN
classiﬁer when the assumption of Theorem 5.2.2 is violated under ` = 5. The most
likely reason is that the number of instances in the IPUMS data is too large and the
number of suppressed instances are negligable relative to its size.
In Figure 5.9(c), we see that the anatomized NN classiﬁer converges faster than
the original NN classiﬁer on the marketing data for all values of `, as expected from
Theorem 5.2.2. The marketing data satisfy the `-diversity condition for ` values 2-to5. Hence, the assumptions of the Theorem 5.2.2 are never violated in the experiments.
Last, Figure 5.9(d) shows that the anatomized NN classiﬁer converges faster than
the original NN classiﬁer on the fatality data under ` = 2. This is again expected
from Theorem 5.2.2 since the fatality data satisfy the `-diversity condition for ` = 2.
It is easy to notice that the convergence of anatomized NN classifer is slower than
the original NN classiﬁer under ` = 3 and ` = 4 due to suppression, as expected.

5.3.3 Student t-test for Anatomized k-NN versus Original k-NN
Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 give the statistical test results for conﬁdence interval
0.95. In all Tables, “P” stands for pass while “F” stands for fail. “N/A” stands for
not applicable in cases where the domain size of sensitive attribute is less than the
` value. “Org.” stand for the original k-NN whereas “`” stand for the anatomized
k-NN. Note that we do the test for original k-NN vs anatomized k-NN, because the
Theorem 5.2.3’s scope covers this analysis.
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Table 5.1.: Anatomized k-NN vs Original k-NN on Adult
Classiﬁer Org. vs ` = 2 Org. vs ` = 3 Org. vs ` = 4 Org. vs ` = 5
NN

F

F

F

F

3-NN

F

P

P

P

5-NN

P

F

F

P

7-NN

F

P

P

P

9-NN

P

P

P

P

Table 5.2.: Anatomized k-NN vs Original k-NN on IPUMS
Classiﬁer Org. vs ` = 2 Org. vs ` = 3 Org. vs ` = 4 Org. vs ` = 5
NN

P

P

P

P

3-NN

P

P

P

P

5-NN

P

P

P

P

7-NN

P

P

P

P

9-NN

P

P

P

P

Table 5.3.: Anatomized k-NN vs Original k-NN on Marketing
Classiﬁer Org. vs ` = 2 Org. vs ` = 3 Org. vs ` = 4 Org. vs ` = 5
NN

P

P

P

P

3-NN

P

P

P

P

5-NN

P

P

P

P

7-NN

F

F

F

F

9-NN

P

F

F

F

From the Tables, the combinations of ` and hyperparameter k give at least 1
statistically signiﬁcant comparison when there is no suppression in the creation of the
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Table 5.4.: Anatomized k-NN vs Original k-NN on Fatality
Classiﬁer Org. vs ` = 2 Org. vs ` = 3 Org. vs ` = 4
NN

F

P

P

3-NN

F

F

P

5-NN

F

F

P

7-NN

P

F

P

9-NN

P

F

F

anatomized training data. There is at least one statistically signiﬁcant comparison
when the theoretical analysis is supposed to hold under the `-diversity condition.
In the adult dataset, there is no signiﬁcant advantage to having original data
for NN classiﬁer as t-test comparison fails for all ` values. We can draw the same
conclusion in the marketing dataset for 7-NN and 9-NN classiﬁers, especially when
` ≥ 3. In the fatality dataset, 3-NN and 5-NN classiﬁers do not have signiﬁcant
advantage for using original data when ` = 2 and ` = 3. Last, the results in the
ipums dataset show that having original data has signiﬁcant advantage in all k-NN
classiﬁers and ` values. However, the results here show that using anatomized data
could still give classiﬁers that could approach to the generalization error of the original
k-NN classiﬁers.
Among the anatomized and the original data, choosing the one which has signiﬁcant advantage depends on the data domain, the classiﬁcation task, the model
hyperparameter and the privacy protection level (`). We can conclude that sharing
the anatomized data within an organization is a very viable option.
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6 SUPPORT VECTOR CLASSIFICATION FOR `-DIVERSITY
In this chapter, we will consider again a theoretical approach for data classiﬁcation
in a non-distributed learning scheme. The data is still assumed to be released to a
third party and anybody can train models from the released data. Our theoretical
approach will diﬀer from the previous chapter though the learning techniques used
to solve the Problem 2.1.1. We will focus on a parametric model here, in particular
on support vector classiﬁcation. A preprocessing algorithm will be proposed for the
anatomized training data and the learning theory will be elaborated to derive the
generalization ability of the support vector classiﬁer after preprocessing.
The chapter organization will be the following. Section 6.1 will give the notations
throughout the chapter and will recap the outcome of the statistical learning theory
for support vector classiﬁcation. Section 6.2 will explain in detail the preprocessing
algorithm we propose and its theoretical implications on the generalization of support
vector classiﬁcation. Section 6.3 will conclude the chapter with experiment results
on publicly available datasets. The discussion here will follow mostly Mancuhan et
al. [76].

6.1 Notations
We now summarize the notations used in this chapter. xi will denote a training
instance in the original training data D and pruned training data DP interchangeably
(We will explain pruning later, this is created from the anatomized data). N will be
the total number of instances in D and DP . X will be a random variable vector in D
and DP interchangeably. D ⊂ Rd+1 and DP ⊂ Rd+1 will hold in Euclidean space (see
Section 6.2.2 for practical issues). y will be the binary class label with values {0, 1}.
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f (X) = wX + b will be a linear classiﬁer such that w ∈ Rd+1 and b ∈ R. F is the
functional space
{f : Rd+1 → {0, 1} : f (X) = wX + b, b ∈ R, w ∈ Rd+1 }.

(6.1)

We will use f instead of f (X) for shorthand in subsequent parts of this chapter. The
risk of a linear classiﬁer f , R(f ), is (6.2).
Z
R(f ) = |(y − f (X))|p(X, y)dXdy

(6.2)

In (6.2), p(X, y) is the joint probability density of training instances X with class
bN (f ), is (6.3).
label y. The empirical risk of classiﬁer f , R
N

X
bN (f ) = 1
I(y 6= f (xi ))
R
N i=1

(6.3)

In (6.3), N is the number of training instances and I(∗) is the indicator function.
bN (f ).
The linear classiﬁer f is an empirical risk minimizer such that fbN = argminR
f ∈F

Given the empirical risk minimizer fbN is the SVC with the largest margin, bound
(6.4) holds
E[(R||w||)2 ]
E[R(fbN )] ≤
N

(6.4)

when the training data is linearly separable [77]. In (6.4), R stands for the radius of
the sphere that the shatterable instances lie on and w stands for the weight vector of
hyperplane f (X) in (6.1) [77, 78]. Given some δ such that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and the same
SVC, the bound (6.5) of generalization ability holds with probability 1 − δ [77, 78].
s
(d + 2)log(N + 1) + log( 2δ )
b
(6.5)
E[R(fN )] − inf R(f ) ≤ 4
N
f ∈F
In (6.5), inf R(f ) is the minimum possible risk for the SVC f . Next, we deﬁne our
f ∈F

pruning mechanism.
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(a) Original Data
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(b) Case of ` = 2 (Aid = A1 , AS = A2 )

Figure 6.1.: Training Data Example

6.2 Pruning Mechanism for Anatomization
6.2.1 Algorithm
We will explain our algorithm (σG in Deﬁnition 3.0.14) through the example in
Figure 6.1. The curious reader should visit Figures 6.5 and 6.6 in Section 6.2.2 to see
the pseudo code and the complexity. Although the example is for any linear classiﬁer
(hyperplane), the pruning mechanism is valid for SVC and SVM. We later deﬁne the
generalization ability of pruned SVC/SVM (cf. Deﬁnition 3.0.15).
Figure 6.1(a) shows the original training data with six instances: two instances
of a blue class (on the left side) and four of a red class (on the right side), with
two attributes A1 and A2 . Here, every instance has a diﬀerent shape and ﬁlling
combination since they are unique. Figure 6.1(b) shows the anatomized training data
with 12 instances created from pairs IT (A1 , GID) and ST (GID, A2 ) when ` = 2 (cf.
Deﬁnitions 3.0.10 and 3.0.11).
A typical training procedure would be the subtraction of mean from attributes A1
and A2 in the original training data, and solving an objective function of a perceptron
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Figure 6.2.: Linear Classiﬁer from Original Training Data

or SVC (cf. Figure 6.2). In Figure 6.2, the original training data is linearly separable
and the instances which are closest to the separating hyperplane lie on the surface of
the circle 1 . This circle is the key point of linear classiﬁcation, because the original
training data is guaranteed to be linearly separable if the instances that are closest
to the decision boundary lie on the surface of a circle [77]. This observation lets us
deﬁne two steps of the pruning mechanism algorithm:
1. Prerequisite Step: Estimate the circle of shatterable instances from the anatomized training data (Algorithm in Figure 6.5) (See [78] for a discussion of
shatterable instances).
2. Pruning Step: For every group in the anatomized training data, pick an
instance that is closest to the surface of the estimated circle of shatterable
instances (Algorithm in Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.3 show the range of radiuses for all possible circles of shatterable instances
in the prerequisite step. The radius of the original training data must be between the
1

The discussion can be generalized to sphere for 3 or larger dimensions. See Burges [77] and Vapnik
[78] for general discussion.
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Normalized Anatomized Training Data
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Figure 6.3.: Possible Circles of Shatterable Points

norms of the pair of instances that are closest to (rAmin in Figure 6.3) and farthest
from (rAmax in Figure 6.3), the origin. Under the random worlds assumption [11], the
prerequisite step assumes that (rAmin , rAmax ) has uniform distribution and therefore
estimates the expected radius E[r] with

rAmin +rAmax
2

(dashed green line in Figure 6.3).

Using the estimated radius from the prerequisite step, the pruning step creates the
pruned training data in Figure 6.4. Figure 6.4 also has the hyperplane that is trained
from the pruned training data. Although the shatterable instances of the pruned
training data (cf. Figure 6.4) are the same as the shatterable instances of the original
training data (cf. Figure 6.2), other instances are diﬀerent. The purpose of the
pruning step is to ﬁnd a linearly separable case instead of distribution reconstruction.
There are two remaining issues to address. First is the application of the pruning
algorithm even if the anatomized training data is not linearly separable (cf. Figure
6.1(b)). The instances within each group are not linearly independent from the other
` − 1 instances and the shattering property is damaged [77]. The second issue is
non-separable original and anatomized training data. If the training data is not
linearly separable in the original (d + 1) dimensional space, the right approach would
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Figure 6.4.: Linear Classiﬁer from Pruned Training Data

be projecting it into higher dimensional space, apply the pruning algorithm in the
projected space, or use a soft margin classiﬁer.

6.2.2 Pseudo code and Complexity
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 give the pseudocodes of the two steps described in Section
6.2.1. In the pseudocodes, the parameter DA signiﬁes the augmented anatomized
training data. The augmentation here includes three points:
1. After the inner join operation between the IT and ST tables (cf. Deﬁnition
3.0.11), the instances are sorted with respect to the attribute GID; and then
the attributes IT.GID and ST.GID are dropped.
2. The mean of every numeric and non-numeric ordinal attribute is subtracted in
the augmented anatomized training data. If the attribute Ai is non-numeric
ordinal, we replaced the non-numeric values with integer values 1 to |dom(Ai )|
according to domain-wise order and set the mode of the discrete values to be
the mean.
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computePrerequisites (𝐷𝐴 ):
‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 ‖2 ≔ +∞ //Squared norm of minimum potential radius
‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 ‖2 ≔ −∞ //Squared norm of maximum potential radius
𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ≔ ∅ //List of squared norms
for 𝑖 = 1 to |𝐷𝐴 |:
2

𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ≔ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ∪ ‖𝐷𝐴 [𝑖]‖
2

if(‖𝐷𝐴 [𝑖]‖ ≤ ‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 ‖2 ) then
2

‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 ‖2 ≔ ‖𝐷𝐴 [𝑖]‖
2

if(‖𝐷𝐴 [𝑖]‖ ≥ ‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 ‖2 ) then
2

‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 ‖2 ≔ ‖𝐷𝐴 [𝑖]‖
//Estimate the expected squared radius from 𝑈[‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 ‖2 , ‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 ‖2 ]
‖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 ‖2 + ‖𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 ‖2
𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ] ≔
2
return (𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ],𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 )

Figure 6.5.: Prerequisite Step Pseudocode

pruneTrainingData (𝐷𝐴 ):
(𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ] , 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ) ≔ computePrerequisites (𝐷𝐴 )
𝐷𝑝 ≔ ∅ //List holding the pruning result
𝑖 ≔ 0 //index for instances
𝑗 ≔ 0 //index for visited groups
while (𝑖 < |𝐷𝐴 |):
𝑑𝑐 ≔ +∞ //distance between the chosen instance in a group and 𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ]
𝑔𝑐 ≔ +∞ //index of the instance in a group with distance 𝑑𝑐
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 ≔ |𝐺𝑗 | //Total number of instances for all visited groups
//Look for an instance closest to 𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ] in the current group
while (𝑖 < 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 ):
𝑑 ≔ |𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑞𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 [𝑖] − 𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ]|
if(𝑑 < 𝑑𝑐 ) then //a closer instance to 𝐸[‖𝑅‖2 ]
𝑑𝑐 ≔ 𝑑
𝑔𝑐 ≔ 𝑖
𝑖 ≔𝑖+1
𝐷𝑝 ≔ 𝐷𝑝 ∪ 𝐷𝐴 [𝑔𝑐 ]
if(𝑗 < |𝐺|) then //Update number of instances for the next visited group
𝑗 ≔𝑗+1
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 ≔ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 + |𝐺𝑗 |
return 𝐷𝑝

Figure 6.6.: Pruning Step Pseudocode
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3. If the attribute Ai is non-numeric nominal, we replaced the mode of Ai with
integer 0 and the rest of the of Ai values with integer 1.
Note that the pseudocodes use the squared norm instead of the norm itself, because
Theorem 6.2.1 deﬁnes the generalization error upper bound with the squared radius
of the sphere containing the shatterable instances of the original training data D.
The complexity of the algorithm in Figure 6.6 is O(N (d + 2)). Note that although
there are 2 while loops in the algorithm, every instance is visited once and the algorithm doesn’t go through d+1 attributes due to listsqN orm which makes the execution
time of pruning O(N ). The prerequisites algorithm need to visit every instance and
dimension which makes the execution time O(N (d + 1)). So the total execution time
is O(N (d + 2)). All the groups (G) and the total number of instances within each
group (Gj ) of the anatomized training data are assumed to be known. In case it is not
known, the grouping information can be computed using an inner join operation and
group by query on IT and ST tables. Such a nested operation is easily implemented
in O(N log N ) execution time.

6.2.3 Privacy Preservation
The preprocessing and pruning steps preserve the `-diversity condition of anatomization. The algorithm doesn’t estimate the correct matchings between the identifying and the sensitive tables. Instead, it makes a guess within each group which is
expected to give some linearly separable training data. It is possible that the original
training data isn’t linearly separable or even is a random set of instances without any
pattern (see Section 6.3).

6.2.4 Generalization Error of Pruned SVC
We will now give the upper bound on the generalization error of the pruned SVC
(cf. Deﬁnition 3.0.15).
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Theorem 6.2.1 Let N be the number of instances, d be the number of identifying
attributes and d + 1 be the total number of attributes in the original and the pruned
training data. Let R be the radius of sphere containing the shatterable instances of
the original training data D and w be the weights of the linear hyperplane resulting
from linear SV classiﬁer trained on the original training data D. Let Rp and wp be
the symmetric notations for a linear SV classiﬁer trained on the pruned training data
Dp . Assume that all the training instances are located in an Euclidean space Rd+1 .
Let || ∗ || be the Euclidean norm of vector ∗. Let r2 be (R||w||)2 , rp2 be (RP ||wp ||)2 ,
bN (f ) be the empirical risk
[rp2 ]min be min{rp2 } > 0 and [rp2 ]max be max{rp2 } < ∞. Let R
bNp (f ) be the empirical risk on the pruned
of on the original training data D and R
training data. Let F be the functional space deﬁning the set of possible linear SV
classiﬁers on the original training data D and Fp be the functional space of possible
linear SV classiﬁers on the pruned training data DP . Let fbN be the empirical risk
bN (f ) and fbNp be the empirical risk minimizer
minimizer such that fbN = argminR
f ∈F

bNp (f ) Last, let inf R(f ) be the lowest value of the risk of
such that fbNp = argminR
f ∈Fp

f ∈F

the linear SV classiﬁer f that could be analytically calculated. Given some δ such that
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the expected risk E[R(fbNp )] of fbNp converges, with probability 1 − δ, to
inf R(f ) under the upper bound
f ∈F

s
E[R(fbNp )] − inf R(f ) ≤ 4
f ∈F

(d + 2)log(N + 1) + log( 2δ )
N
2
2
[rp ]max − [rp ]min
+
N

(6.6)

using only DP .
Proof From 6.4, we have
E[R(fbNp )] ≤

E[rp2 ]
N

(6.7)
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Let  > 0 be the small change on r2 caused by DP such that rp2 = r2 ±  holds. Using
6.7, we have
E[rp2 ]
N
E[r2 ]

=
±
N
N

E[R(fbNp )] ≤

From 6.4, we also have R(fbN ) ≤

E [r2 ]
.
N

(6.8)

Using this in the second line of 6.8 results in


E[R(fbNp )] ≤ max{R(fbN )} ±
N

(6.9)

Subtracting inf R(f ) from both sides of 6.9 gives 6.10.
f ∈F


E[R(fbNp )] − inf R(f ) ≤ max{R(fbN )} − inf R(f ) ±
N
f ∈F
f ∈F

(6.10)

Using 6.5 in the right-hand side of 6.10 and considering the worst case of rp2 = r2 + 
result in 6.11 with probability 1 − δ.
s
E[R(fbNp )] − inf R(f ) ≤ 4
f ∈F

(d + 2)log(N + 1) + log( 2δ )
N

+
N

(6.11)

Since both r2 and rp2 is expected to exist in the interval ([rp2 ]min , [rp2 ]max ) according to
the algorithm in Figure 6.6 and the deﬁnition of maximum margin in the linear SV
classiﬁer [77], 0 ≤  ≤ [rp2 ]max − [rp2 ]min holds. Using  ≤ [rp2 ]max − [rp2 ]min in the
right-hand side of 6.11 gives 6.12.
s
E[R(fbNp )] − inf R(f ) ≤ 4
f ∈F

(d + 2)log(N + 1) + log( 2δ )
N
2
2
[rp ]max − [rp ]min
+
N

This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.2.1.

(6.12)

■

The upper bound (6.6) is deﬁned as the function of two terms where the second
term is the result of using pruned training data. The former upper bound shows
that pruned SVC can be as accurate as the original SVC under two conditions: 1)
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Very large training data size (N → ∞) 2) Small size of sensitive attribute
domain or low ` value or both ([rp2 ]max − [rp2 ]min → 0).
Theorem 6.2.1 holds when the pruned training data is mapped into a higher
dimensional space d0 using the kernel trick. Although the generalization ability of
SVMs with RBF kernel is not formally deﬁned (invalidating Theorem 6.2.1), SVMs
with RBF kernel are expected to work under the conditions of Theorem 6.2.1 in the
inﬁnite dimensional space [77, 78].

6.3 Experiments and Results
6.3.1 Prerequisites
Datasets
We tested our algorithm on the adult, IPUMS and marketing datasets of the UCI
data repository [62] and the fatality dataset of the Keel data repository [74]:
1. Adult: The adult dataset is drawn from the 1994 census data of the United
States [62]. It is composed of 45222 instances after the removal of instances with
missing values. The binary classiﬁcation task is to predict whether a person’s
adjusted gross income is ≤ 50K or > 50K. The attribute “ﬁnal weight” is
ignored. Education was treated as the sensitive attribute in the experiments.
2. IPUMS: This data is drawn from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 census data of
the Los Angeles and Long Beach areas [62]. It has 233584 instances in total.
We picked the 10 attributes that are included in the adult data. The binary
classiﬁcation task is to predict whether a person’s total income is ≤ 50K or
> 50K. The classiﬁers are expected to show a diﬀerent behavior from the
former adult data since the population (and to some extent, classiﬁcation task,
as it is total income rather than adjusted gross income) are diﬀerent. Again,
education was treated as the sensitive attribute in the experiments.
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3. Marketing Data: This data is drawn from a phone based marketing campaign
of a Portuguese banking institution for long term deposits [62]. We created
the following binary classiﬁcation task which is linearly separable under a soft
margin SVC: “among all the people who didn’t submit a long term deposit,
predict whether a person has a housing loan or not”. We performed the following
preprocessing using Weka ﬁlters [63]: 1) pick 39922 instances who didn’t make
a long term deposit 2) choose four attributes job, day, month and age using
the correlation with the class attribute “housing”. Discretized age is treated as
sensitive attribute.
4. Fatality Data: This data is a U.S. National Center for Statistics and Analysis compilation of 2001 car accidents. The original class attribute has eight
labels indicating the level of injury suﬀered [74]. We created the binary “Injured” and “No Injury” in the following way: 1) remove the instances with labels “Injured Severity Unknown”, “Died Prior to Accident”, “Unknown” and
“Possible Injury’ from the original data. This results in 91085 instances 2) label “Injured” the instances with labels “Nonincapaciting Evident Injury”, “Incapaciting Injury” and “Fatal Injury”. No feature selection is applied on this
dataset. “POLICE REPORTED ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT” was treated
as sensitive attribute.
Weka was used for attribute selection and discretization where needed [63].

Privacy Setup
The anatomization was done according to Xiao et al.’s bucketization algorithm
[11]. When `-diversity is not satisﬁed, the instances were divided into groups of size `
according to the original bucketization algorithm. Leftover instances were suppressed
(not used in training models).
k-Anonymized training data was also created for the adult dataset. We used Inan
et al.’s value generalization hierarchies in the experiments. The privacy parameters
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were k = ` for k-anonymity and `-diversity to compare the classiﬁers using the same
group sizes in the training data.
Anonymized and anatomized training data had the same identifying and sensitive
attributes. The sensitive attributes were chosen such that the `-diversity is satisﬁed
for at least ` = 2.

Model Evaluation Setup
LibSVM version 3.21 was used for the support vector classiﬁcation [79]. We trained
the support vector machine with linear (SVC) and RBF kernels (SVM).
10-fold cross validation was used for evaluation. The comparison includes pruned
SVC/SVM, original SVC/SVM and identifying SVC/SVM. The comparison on adult
dataset also include k-anonymized SVC/SVM. The k-anonymized SVC/SVM are not
included for other datasets since Inan et al. provided generalization hierarchies only
in the adult dataset [25]. Last, the error rates of pruned and original SVC/SVM are
compared using the Student t-test (See Section 6.3.3). Other models are not included,
because Theorem 6.2.1 covers only pruned and original SVC/SVM.

6.3.2 Analysis of Results
The ﬁrst aspect is the comparison between the pruned and original SVC/SVM.
From Theorem 6.2.1, we expect that the average error rates of pruned SVC/SVM
will be greater then the original SVC/SVM’s if there is no suppression due to the `diversity constraint. One exceptional case would be the regularization eﬀect where `diversity and the pruning algorithm reduces either the bias of underﬁtting SVC/SVM
or the variance of overﬁtting SVC/SVM. Another exceptional case would be the suppression of many instances of the original training data due to `-diversity constraint.
This violates the assumption of Theorem 6.2.1. We will refer to this aspect of experiments pruned-to-original in the rest of the chapter.

82
The second aspect is the comparison between pruned and identifying SVC/SVM.
From the shattering properties of the statistical learning theory, the pruned SVC/SVM
are expected to outperform the identifying SVC/SVM if the sensitive attribute is a
good predictor of the class attribute. If the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor of
the class attribute, the opposite of the former behavior is expected to occur. We will
refer to this aspect of experiments pruned-to-identifying in the rest of the chapter.
Last, the third aspect is the comparison between the pruned and k-anonymized
SVC/SVM. The pruned SVC/SVM are expected to outperform the k-anonymized
SVC/SVM because anatomization preserves the original values for all the attributes.
We will refer to this aspect of experiments pruned-to-k-anonymized in the rest of the
chapter.
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Figure 6.7.: SVC on Adult

Figures 6.7 to 6.14 show the results of all the experiments. In all Figures, “Org.”
and “Id.” labels will stand for the original SVC/SVM and the identifying SVC/SVM
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respectively. The pruned and k-anonymized SVC/SVM will be represented by their
respective privacy parameters (L for ` and k for k.)
Figure 6.7 shows a surprising result of pruned SVC in the pruned-to-original and
pruned-to-identifying cases. In the pruned-to-original case, increasing ` reduces the
average error rate of the pruned SVC; `-diversity and the pruning algorithm apparently regularize the underﬁtting original SVC. Theorem 6.2.1 does not hold as
well for ` ≥ 4, because some original training data instances are suppressed. In
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Figure 6.8.: SVM on Adult

the pruned-to-identifying case, the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor of the class
attribute. Identifying SVC performs better than many pruned SVCs. In the prunedto-k-anonymized case, the average error rate of pruned SVC is less than the average
error rate of k-anonymized SVC for all ` = k values.
Figure 6.8 shows the expected results of pruned SVM in all three aspects. Increasing ` result in the increase of average error rate for pruned SVM and original
SVM outperforms the pruned SVM. The expectation from Theorem 6.2.1 occurs here
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despite suppression (violation of assumption). We believe that `-diversity and pruning algorithm act as a regularizer for SVMs with RBF kernel which tend to overﬁt to
the training data. Notice that the sensitive attribute is a good predictor of the class
attribute in the inﬁnite dimensional space since average error rate of pruned SVM is
less than the average error rate of identifying SVM. Last, the average error rate of
the pruned SVM is less than the k-anonymized SVM by 0.1.
Figure 6.9 shows in general the expected result of pruned SVC in the pruned-tooriginal. ` = 4 is a specialcase where its average error rate is greater than the pruned
SVC’s that is trained on 5-diverse data. Theorem 6.2.1’s assumption is violated
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Figure 6.9.: SVC on IPUMS

again when ` = 5 because some original training data instances are suppressed. In
the pruned-to-identifying case, the pruned SVC cannot capture the good shattering
property that the sensitive attribute provide in the original dimensional space.
Figure 6.10 shows in general the expected result of pruned SVM for prunedto-original and pruned-to-identifying aspects. In the pruned-to-original aspect, the
pruned SVM outperforms the original SVM when ` = 2. This shows that the pruning
algorithm and `-diversity has the regularization eﬀect even if the sensitive attribute
is a good predictor according to the pruned-to-identifying aspect. The regularization
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case could occur in general, because it is statistically signiﬁcant for conﬁdence interval
0.95 (See Table 6.2).
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Figure 6.11.: SVC on Marketing

Figure 6.11 show the expected behavior of pruned SVC in the pruned-to-original
aspect. One thing to emphasize is the surprising spike in the error rate distribution
when ` = 5. The reason is that the original training data satisﬁes the `-diversity
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condition when ` = 2 and ` = 3. When ` = 5, almost half of the training instances
are suppressed. This strongly violates the assumption of Theorem 6.2.1 and the result
is also not statistically signiﬁcant (cf. Table 6.1). We should note that the sensitive
attribute is a bad predictor since the average error rates of pruned SVC are greater
than the identifying SVC’s.
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Figure 6.12.: SVM on Marketing

Figure 6.12 show the expected behavior of pruned SVC in the pruned-to-original
aspect. The pruned SVC also show the expected result in the pruned-to-identifying
aspect. The sensitive attribute is not a good predictor in the inﬁnite dimensional
space.
In Figure 6.13, the pruned SVC gives an interesting and surprising result in the
pruned-to-original case. The average error rate of pruned SVC is approximately same
as the average error rate of original SVC for all ` values. We believe that this would
only occur in this dataset because the results are not statistically signiﬁcant (cf.
Table 6.1.) When ` = 3 and ` = 4, the assumption in Theorem 6.2.1 is violated
because most of the training instances are suppressed. In the pruned-to-identifying
case, sensitive attribute is bad (insigniﬁcant) predictor since the pruned SVC does
not reduce the error rate of the identifying SVC.
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Figure 6.14 show the expected results of pruned SVM in the pruned-to-original and
pruned-to-identifying aspects (despite violating the assumption of Theorem 6.2.1). In
the pruned-to-identifying aspect, note that the sensitive attribute is a bad predictor
in the inﬁnite dimensional space. The average error rate of pruned SVM is greater
than the identifying SVM’s.
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6.3.3 Student t-test for Pruned SVC/SVM versus Original SVC/SVM
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give the statistical test results for conﬁdence interval 0.95.
In all Tables, “P” stands for pass while “F” stands for fail. “N/A” stands for not
applicable in cases where the domain size of the sensitive attribute is less than the
` value. “Org.” stand for the original SVC/SVM whereas “`” stand for the pruned
SVC/SVM. Note that we do the test for original SVC/SVM vs pruned SVC/SVM,
because the Theorem 6.2.1’s scope covers this analysis.
Table 6.1.: Pruned SVC vs Original SVC
Dataset

Org. vs

Org. vs Org. vs Org. vs

`=2

`=3

`=4

`=5

Marketing

P

F

F

F

Fatality

F

F

F

N/A

IPUMS

F

P

P

P

Adult

F

F

F

F

In Section 6.3.2, we saw the theoretically expected results for pruned SVC vs original SVC when they are trained on IPUMS dataset (cf. Figure 6.9). Table 6.1 shows
that the diﬀerence between the pruned and original SVC is statistically signiﬁcant
for almost all ` values. We saw, in contrast, theoretically unexpected results in case
of pruned SVC vs. original SVC on the adult and fatality datasets. Table 6.1 shows
that the diﬀerence between the pruned and original SVC are statistically insigniﬁcant
in adult and fatality datasets. As such, the theoretically unexpected results are likely
to occur by just random chance, rather than suggesting an issue with Theorem 6.2.1.
In the marketing dataset, the diﬀerence between the pruned and the original SVC
is statistically insigniﬁcant for ` values 3-to-5. When ` = 5, most of the training
instances were suppressed. Note that Theorem 6.2.1 holds if and only if both the
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pruned and the original training dataset have the same number of instances (no or
negligible suppression.) (See Theorem 6.2.1)
Table 6.2 shows that the diﬀerence between pruned SVM and original SVM are
statistically signiﬁcant in almost all datasets for multiple ` values. The expectation
from Theorem 6.2.1 occurred in all the datasets. (cf. Figures 6.8, 6.10, 6.12 and 6.14)
The good results are therefore very unlikely to occur by random chance, suggesting
Theorem 6.2.1 applies to inﬁnite dimensions. This result concurs with Vapnik and
Table 6.2.: Pruned SVM vs Original SVM
Dataset

Org. vs Org. vs

Org. vs

Org. vs

`=2

`=3

`=4

`=5

Marketing

P

P

P

P

Fatality

F

P

P

N/A

IPUMS

P

P

P

P

Adult

P

P

P

P

Burges’ claim for the original SVM when there is no suppression [77, 78]. Last,
we observe surprisingly signiﬁcant results when the assumption of Theorem 6.2.1
is violated. We believe that the `-diversity and pruning acts as a regularizer since
SVMs with RBF kernel tend to overﬁt to the training data.
In summary, we measured the statistically signiﬁcant error rates when the pruned
SVC/SVM show the expectation from Theorem 6.2.1. The error rates were statistically insigniﬁcant when they don’t respect the expected result of Theorem 6.2.1 or
when the pruned training data violates the assumption of Theorem 6.2.1.
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7 SUMMARY
This dissertation proposes the following problem in the context of data classiﬁcation
under the privacy standard `-diversity:
Deﬁne heuristics to train classiﬁers on anatomized data without violating `-diversity while using the sensitive information, with a theoretical
guarantee of good generalization under reasonable assumptions.
As the problem description states, `-diversity is respected in the context of the
anatomization scheme. This problem is tackled following both empirical and theoretical methodology. The empirical approach is set in a distributed environment
which makes the solution of the problem relatively easy, because the owner of the
data is involved in the learning scheme. The purpose of the empirical approach is to
investigate the feasibility of the problem for further theoretical elaboration. Provided
the interesting outcome of the empirical methods in the distributed learning, the
theoretical analysis is done for non-parametric and parametric classiﬁers in a more
challenging non-distributed setting. In this case, the challenge is in building the classiﬁers without involving the owner of the data. All the work is achieved for a real
world prediction task that is deﬁned for anatomization.
Chapter 4 explains the ﬁrst proposed method in the distributed setting, a distributed decision tree classiﬁer. The proposed method is shown to preserve the privacy constraint `-diversity. The distributed decision tree classiﬁer is tested on various
datasets and the results show that fairly accurate decision trees can be built whereas
the learning cost is reduced remarkably for the owner of the data.
Chapter 5 demonstrates the feasibility of non-parametric classiﬁcation in nondistributed setting. The chapter mainly focuses on the k-nearest neighbor classiﬁcation (k-NN). We show that the asymptotic error bounds are the same for anatomized
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data as for the original data. Perhaps surprisingly, the proposed 1-NN classiﬁer has a
faster convergence to the asymptotic error rate than the convergence of 1-NN classiﬁer using the training data without anatomization. In addition, the analysis suggests
that any non-parametric classiﬁer using the anatomized training data has the variance
term of generalization error that is less than the non-parametric classiﬁers’ using the
original training data. In contradiction, any non-parametric classiﬁer using the anatomized training data has bias terms of generalization error that are greater than the
non-parametric classiﬁers’ using the original training data. The anatomized training
data thus pushes the optimum point of bias variance tradeoﬀ towards the bias terms.
Experiments on multiple datasets conﬁrm the theoretical convergence rates. These
experiments also demonstrate that proposed k-NN on anatomized data can outperform k-NN on the original data. In particular, the experiments on well known Adult
data show that 1-NN on anatomized data outperforms learning on data anonymized
to the same anonymity levels using generalization.
Chapter 6 investigates the parametric classiﬁcation in a non-distributed setting.
The chapter mainly focuses on the support vector classiﬁcation. We propose a preprocessing algorithm for anatomization. Our algorithm estimates a linearly separable
training data from the anatomized training data. We deﬁne the generalization ability of support vector classiﬁers when they are trained on the former preprocessed
data. The key point to remember is that our algorithm gives good generalization
guarantees to support vector classiﬁers. The proposed mechanism is evaluated on
multiple publicly available datasets and accurate models are observed in most cases
while `-diversity is preserved.
This dissertation has signiﬁcant impact on applied privacy. Iyengar claims that
the right metric choice and the consideration of classiﬁcation task give k-anonymized
data that results in both high utility and high privacy guarantee [23]. Although he
shows empirically the eﬀect of the group size on the classiﬁcation error, he doesn’t
give the theoretical justiﬁcation about how and why the increasing group size (and
eventually stricter generalization and suppression) impacts the classiﬁcation error.
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Nergiz et al. later show empirically that the small sized groups (small k) result
in low classiﬁcation errors under certain anonymization techniques and metrics [80].
However, their work still excludes the theoretical justiﬁcation about the grouping
impact onto classiﬁcation error. This dissertation ﬁlls this theoretical gap through a
similar standard `-diversity which is also based on groups. The anatomization scheme
here is used to show the impact of the group size.
Anatomization is preferred in this work, because it provides higher data utility
and interpretability than the generalization based k-anonymity and `-diversity methods [11]. At the same time, it also provides some level of protection for the sensitive
attribute. Through the choice of anatomization, this work also shows that the anatomization is a viable option for data publishing within a company or an institution.
The results convey a strong argument against giving everybody access to the original
data within a company to achieve predictive tasks. Such argument is valuable as
more and more data leaks occur over the years because of insider attacks.
Future work exists in the model, the privacy standard and the data publishing
scheme choice. In the model choice, extending the theoretical analysis of anatomization based `-diversity to the other modeling techniques such as the decision trees,
neural networks and ensemble methods would be signiﬁcant contributions. Provided
the same models in this dissertation, comparing theoretically the generalization ability
on anatomization based `-diversity with the generalization ability on generalization
based `-diversity, k-anonymity and diﬀerential privacy would also be other valuable
directions. In particular, showing the generalization impact on the `-diverse groups
would provide valuable insights about the speciﬁc data publishing method choice.
We personally recommend that all these potential directions should include the
scalability challenges as we are currently living in the big data era. We also advise
to the followers of this work to consider ﬁrst ﬁnding the right type of personal data
which has an interesting learning task. This is often ignored due to the theoretical
nature of the topic although the search of the data is one of the biggest challenges
for the privacy work in academia.
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estimation. Journal of IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine
Intelligence, 21(7):643–645, 1999.
[73] Keinosuke Fukunaga and Donald M. Hummels. Bayes error estimation using
parzen and k-nn procedures. Journal of IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis
and Machine Intelligence, (5):634–643, 1987.
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